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FOREWORD
China’s global rise has prompted numerous discussions and studies of this historically monumental
phenomenon and its implications for the world. On
the one hand, China’s emergence as a global player
has generated a lot of optimism for global development and economic convergence. On the other, it has
spurred concerns about possible collisions on the
world stage as existing and emerging powers seek
to retain and redesign their roles and influences. Related opportunities and fears have been especially
pronounced in countries neighboring China, including in Central Asia where the newly independent and
post-Soviet republics face a possibility of yet another
imperial expansion due to strategic advances of the
“Middle Kingdom.”
As the strongest power on the planet, the United
States has a major stake in China’s and the region’s future because both directly affect the U.S. global standing and the U.S.-led global economic and security
order. In this insightful and forward-looking work,
Mr. Roman Muzalevsky, a widely published analyst
and author of Central Asia’s Shrinking Connectivity Gap:
Implications for U.S. Strategy and From Frozen Ties to
Strategic Engagement: U.S.-Iranian Relationship in 2030,
assesses China’s global rise through the prism of geopolitical and geo-economic forces sweeping through
Central Asia. Mr. Muzalevsky concludes that the ability of the United States to “stay relevant globally” hinges on its capacity to boost its lacking regional strategic
presence in Central Asia.
The author advocates for “a robust, direct, and
long-term” U.S. engagement with the region. Washington, he argues, needs to complement its “Pivot to
the Pacific” with a “Pivot to Eurasia” in order to shape
vii

China’s rise on both flanks and ensure a more managed
evolution of the global economic and security architecture. According to Mr. Muzalevsky, the U.S. “pivot” to Asia has aggravated China’s concerns of strategic encirclement by the United States and prompted
Beijing to exploit an opening along the western track
of its global expansion through Central Asia. China’s
regional activities, he finds, are rapidly sidelining all
other powers, and the U.S. planned withdrawal from
Afghanistan and the region may herald lost strategic
opportunities for Washington.
The author presents a convincing case. Bejing is
now the major economic force in the region and continues to build up other components of its strategic
influence in Central Asia in areas as diverse as culture, politics, security, and military. China’s growing
footprint—if left unmanaged—could transform the
region’s geopolitics beyond recognition, undermining Washington’s global role and the sovereignty of
the Central Asian republics. This possibility should
make strategic planners ponder the implications of
China’s potential hegemony in Central Asia, if not the
world—an imperative that Mr. Muzalvesky cogently
articulates and makes all too clear for policymakers.
China’s rise and ongoing transformation of the region’s geopolitics due to “push-pull forces” exerted
by external actors are of strategic importance to the
U.S. position as the global economic and military
leader. The Strategic Studies Institute welcomes Mr.
Muzalevsky’s contribution to the study of these monumental issues and dynamics and highly recommends
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this work for analysts and policymakers interested in
the fate of China, the United, States, Central Asia, and
the world.
			
			
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
China’s emergence as a global actor has questioned
the position of the United States as the strongest power
and the future of the Washington-led global order. But
achieving the status of a truly global player wielding
influence in all dimensions of power would require
China, among other things, to leverage its regional
influence in Central Asia. This region is increasingly
representing China’s western leg of economic expansion and development, and is of a growing strategic
importance for Beijing. It is also a region that should
be of greater strategic importance to Washington,
which seeks to preserve its leading position in the international system and ensure China’s peaceful integration in the global political, security, and economic
architecture.
The question of future economic and security order in Central Asia is thus of paramount importance
to global stability. China is already projecting the
strongest economic presence in the region and has the
potential to build “comprehensive influence” across
economic, cultural, political, military, and security
spheres.
Just as in the Asia-Pacific, it is the rise of China and
its perceived efforts at domination in Central Asia that
are driving the reconfiguration of the region’s geopolitics and are challenging the U.S. global supremacy,
requiring Washington to advance creative economic
and military solutions in the heart of Eurasia. To stay
relevant globally and regionally, the United States has
to pursue a robust, direct, and long-term strategy of
engagement in Central Asia.
As it seeks to do so, Washington cannot premise
its cooperation with other powers in Central Asia on
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the isolation of China—a global force calling for engagement where beneficial and containment where
necessary. Washington should boost military engagement in the region, upgrade its New Silk Road Strategy (NSRS), advance cooperation with key partners,
and shape China’s global ascendance by leveraging
its position in Central Asia. It should consider joining multilateral institutions involving the regional
countries and China, or seek the creation of new ones
to shape China’s regional activities. It should link its
NSRS with China’s “belt” strategy where it benefits
the region’s development while ensuring multidirectional contours of regional geo-economic forces. It
should also start pondering how to leverage its potential strategic relationship with Iran, which links the
Middle East with Central and South Asia, and shares
growing economic ties with China. Finally, it should
develop platforms of cooperation with China in economic and security spheres pertaining to both global
and regional affairs.
None of these tasks are easy to accomplish. This
policy monograph, written in March 2015, sheds light
on the crucial forces at work, assesses the possibility and implications of China’s hegemony in Central
Asia, and highlights the need for Washington to play
real politics at the table rather than from across the
high seas.
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CHINA’S RISE AND RECONFIGURATION OF
CENTRAL ASIA’S GEOPOLITICS:
A CASE FOR U.S. “PIVOT” TO EURASIA
INTRODUCTION
China’s Rise and Shifting Landscape
of Central Asia.
Since China’s opening to the world in 1978, the world
has changed China—and now China is beginning to
change the world.
				David Shambaugh1

Despite a slowdown of China’s economy over the
last few years, analysts view the long-term rise of the
“Middle Kingdom” as a given—an unimpeded development challenging the U.S. global position and reshaping the global order, potentially through a war
between the rising and the status quo power or an
accommodation and global economic convergence.
High economic growth since 1970s has turned China from an isolated actor confined to East Asia and
constrained by the Cold War into the second-largest
economy benefiting enormously from globalization.
China has lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty,
becoming the largest trading partner of more than 120
countries and producing $U.S.1.5 trillion more in gross
domestic product (GDP) than the output of the rest of
the BRICS’ (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) economies combined.2 Today, China is shaping
politics in every corner of the world, having overtaken
the U.S. economy in 2014 as the world’s largest, based
on purchasing power parity calculations. By 2040, its
economy is projected to be three times the size of the
1

U.S. economy and produce 40 percent of the global
output.3
While Beijing’s continued ascendance is not necessarily assured or bound to result in a “harmonious”
world its grand strategy purportedly seeks to achieve,
its expanding capabilities and global role have caused
apprehension among powers of all shapes and sizes.
This is evident in neighboring Central Asia—the region bordering China’s restive Uyghur Autonomous
Region of Xingjian and representing a “periphery” for
China, a “backyard” for Russia, and a “forepost” for
the United States. Traditionally viewed as a backwater—despite the collapse of the Soviet Union, which set
the regional countries free, and the U.S. first-ever military presence in the post-Soviet space, which opened
the region’s connection with South Asia—Central Asia
today is on the verge of being turned by China into the
“Silk Road Economic Belt” linking dynamic centers
in the East and the West and advancing the region’s
internal and external integration. Beijing’s regional
presence—growing rapidly and already changing the
contours of the region’s geopolitical space is projected
to increase significantly, as China and Central Asian
countries lay cross-regional investment, energy, trade,
and transit infrastructure to satisfy their and China’s
growing appetite for Eurasian resources, markets, and
investment opportunities.
China’s growing capabilities and the “belt” strategy enable it to pursue a more assertive role in Central
Asia so as to reduce its dependence on maritime routes
patrolled by the U.S. and Indian navies; claim a geopolitical stake in the region contested by established and
rising powers; enhance stability in Central and South
Asia, especially following the withdrawal of U.S.led coalition forces from Afghanistan; exploit trade,
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investment, and energy development opportunities in
Eurasia; and ensure a more even development of its
coastal and continental zones. China’s overall regional
strategy hinges on its economic expansion, which has
made it the dominant economic actor in Central Asia
and is accelerating the geopolitical realignment in the
heart of the continent, expanding the region’s internal
and external connectivity. As one analyst put it, “The
frontiers of China are moving even if its boundaries
are not.” While China relies mostly on sea-borne trade,
its expansion as the soon-to-be largest economy has
spurred increased demand for transcontinental land
corridors via Central Asia. Strategically important as
they are for China’s energy security, the land corridors would still not fully meet China’s energy import
needs and are arguably “more vulnerable to physical
security disruptions than sea routes.”4
Beijing has relied on the “belt” strategy, bilateral
deals, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO), comprised of China, Russia, and the Central
Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan,
and Tajikistan, to expand economic flows that are supposed to link its internal areas with neighboring economic zones. Beijing’s reliance on bi- and multilateral
frameworks of cooperation fits the logic of a Chinese
proverb that “we must walk with both legs.”5 Central
Asia is emerging as a second “leg”—in addition to Beijing’s “leg” in East Asia—and a springboard for China
to develop its restive and poor areas of Xingjian, Tibet,
and Inner Mongolia, and to expand its external, westward development push.
China is now the largest trading partner of Russia,
Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, as well as the secondlargest partner for Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, and
the third-largest partner for Tajikistan.6 More than 75
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percent of external trade of Xingjian, which hosts China’s nuclear testing ground at Lop Nor and nuclear
ballistic missiles, is with Central Asia. Xingjian, which
means “new territory,” is home to China’s largest deposits of gold, uranium, oil, and gas. As China’s economic growth model changes from the one predominantly based on savings and exports to the one based
largely on domestic consumption and export of hightech products,7 the burgeoning “Middle Kingdom”
will need to rely on nearby economic zones to sustain
its economic expansion. This task is imperative, given
a slowdown of China’s economic growth rate, looming
debt, and difficulties with the management of popular political and economic expectations regarding the
country’s development and role in global affairs. Central Asia’s growing strategic importance for Beijing’s
transcontinental and global policies thus highlights
benefits and challenges for the region’s connectivity
with the world and for the U.S. global role and policy,
as Beijing seeks to secure its unity and the periphery (China often views its neighbors as “periphery
countries”8).
Beijing’s regional agenda conflicts with long-term
designs of other powers, even if China has not yet
matched its growing economic presence with military expansion in Central Asia. Great and mediumsized powers alike perceive its economic advances as
constraining Russia-led Eurasian Union (EU), India’s
“Connect Central Asia” policy, and U.S. Silk Road
Economic Strategy (NSRS), among other similar projects advanced by Japan, South Korea, Turkey, and
other actors. Points of convergence exist within regional policies of these states, and select components
of these policies contribute to regional development.
But the long-term designs of these powers on Central
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Asia can also produce mutually exclusive policies and
outcomes or create conditions for instability due to
external rivalries for influence and primacy in Central Asia. On the one hand—Russia and China: two
authoritarian powers with imperial histories respectively are seeking to retain and project dominance in
the region. Moscow and Beijing are advancing alternative and opposing geo-political visions for Central
Asia, while working in concert and individually to
keep Washington and Delhi out of the region. On the
other hand—the United States and India: the democratic superpower from across the high seas and the
global power-in-the-making from within the broader
region, are respectively struggling to anchor their
strategic presence, while trying to break Moscow’s
security monopoly and shape China’s geo-economic
expansion.
Converging and diverging capabilities and goals
of these powers—both as loose partner camps and
individual actors—and attempted multivector policies of the regional republics prompt reconfiguration
of Central Asia’s geopolitics by producing multidirectional “push-pull” forces and shifting economic
flows that simultaneously “glue” the regional states
and their partners together and pull them apart in a
continuously shifting mode of geopolitical and geoeconomic interaction. An already observed outcome
of these developments is a functional division of labor
among external powers, with Russia retaining a predominant security role; China gaining the preeminent
economic role; the EU positioning itself as an economic, democratization, and development partner; the
United States leading a military role in Afghanistan
while advancing north-south integration; and India
pursuing its assumed role of interconnector of Central
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and South Asia. These dynamics position China as the
major force capable of projecting hegemony in Central
Asia if other players sleep through another round of
the unfolding “Great Game.”
The sheer economic advance by China today
makes the Central Asian states ponder security and
geopolitical implications of Beijing’s growing regional
presence. Their mission and fate seem to be clear: they
could either leverage China’s rise to become more autonomous units or fall into Beijing’s orbit and delay, if
not lose entirely, their nascent evolution as sovereign
subjects. But the reality is also clear; the prevalent talk
and unfolding of the “Great Game,” as well as the role
of the big players in the region’s future, demonstrate
that the Central Asian states have not consolidated
their sovereignties and are subject to pressures to conform to agendas of great powers, despite their relative success in balancing them off one another. There
is a light at the end of the tunnel, however. Just as the
external pressures are a source of alarm, they are also
a source of opportunity if the regional states play the
“Game” right; undertake major reforms, integrate
from within, and position the region as a strong platform for players of all sizes.
Assuming China succeeded in exerting hegemony
over Central Asia, what attributes would this hegemony have? How could the United States, its partners,
and the Central Asian countries shape it while protecting their interests? If history and China’s recent activities are any guide, China would be unlikely to pursue
territorial control over the region, unless its expanded
interests are threatened significantly. Instead, it would
likely project an economic, political, and cultural influence through strategic bilateral relationships and
multilateral institutional networks involving massive
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infrastructure projects with significant Chinese capital, as well as cultural and demographic presence that
would only grow with China’s expanding economic
footprint.
China would complement the practical aspects of
this hegemony by drawing on the legacy of its tributary system of relations with “peripheral” territories,
Confucian values propagated via already proliferating
Confucian Institutes, and political ideas and practices
favoring both open markets and state control. The
more China imbeds itself economically and culturally
in the region, the more likely it is to project a military
presence in Central Asia. With time, the Confucian
values of “harmony,” “universal concord,” “co-existence,” and “co-prosperity” could replace Western
narratives and practices of geopolitical control and
domination and form a new logic of geopolitics with
emphasis on cooperation.9 Of course, China could still
use its increased military strength to fuel a military
expansion into parts of Central Asia that hold strategic value for its global or regional hegemonic position,
including by establishing military bases.
What happens to China’s social, economic, and
political transformation in the long term and how it
could affect its hegemony is a question of great importance. China’s projected rise to the high-income status may spur democratization of its political system,
generating beneficial effects on Central Asian regimes.
On the other hand, China may demonstrate a sustained capacity to be simultaneously wealthy and authoritarian, impeding democratization of the regional
countries.
If China’s hegemony brought development and
prosperity to Central Asia—and it could—historians
would term it a benevolent one. If it brought subjuga-
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tion and exploitation, it would be yet another episode
of imperial expansion by a neighboring power. Either
way, the Central Asian states must have a say in their
future. The region’s history and geography dictate
that they can only have this voice by building diverse
ties with as many powers as practical so as to prevent
one power from dominating the region. The regional
states will be prompted to turn to Russia, India, the
EU, and the United States to deflect growing pressure from the “east” as they continue their, at times,
unintended quest of connecting with each other and
the world.
China’s long-term economic expansion and hegemony are not a given. China faces significant social,
environmental, and economic challenges, as well as
agendas of other powers, that could derail or constrain its global rise.10 Russia is trying to revitalize
its regional influence; India seeks to establish a strategic presence; the EU tries to expand its regional
economic role; and the United States continues to be
a major regional military power given its presence in
Afghanistan.
But these powers are not without their own challenges, and that has been good news for China. Russia’s economic fundamentals are weak, making it look
like a contracting empire but act like an expanding
one; India is a latecomer to Central Asia, embroiled
in domestic and South Asian politics holding it back
from marching northward; the EU lacks the “teeth;”
while the U.S. economic influence is insignificant and
its regional military role is a big unknown after 2016.
This allows China to advance its influence across all
areas in Central Asia, as well as build and project its
“comprehensive national power,” while addressing
its domestic and global challenges.

8

Washington has done much to open China and
Central Asia to the outside world. But it now risks
foregoing the benefits of Central Asia’s rise as a transcontinental hub of energy, trade, and transit in Eurasia. Washington’s withdrawal from the region and
China’s rise raise the question of how to shape Central
Asia’s evolution on terms favorable to Washington
and the Central Asian countries and how to link the
pursuit of this objective with the U.S. global agenda
and grand strategy. If it wants to stay relevant globally and regionally, the United States has to pursue
a robust, direct, and long-term strategy of engagement in Central Asia. This is not only because of the
planned military withdrawal from Afghanistan, or the
renewed push by Moscow for regional integration.
Washington is facing an unfavorable future because
of its declining global standing and reconfiguration of
the global security and economic architecture caused
by the rise of new power centers, especially China.
Just as in the Asia-Pacific, it is the rise of China and its
perceived efforts at domination in Central Asia that
are challenging the U.S. global supremacy, requiring Washington to advance creative economic and
military solutions in the heart of Eurasia. The United
States should complement its “Pivot to the Pacific”
with a sharp “Pivot to Eurasia” in order to effectively
shape China’s rise and the evolution of the global
security order.
As it seeks to do so, Washington cannot premise
its cooperation with other powers in Central Asia on
the isolation of China—a global force calling for engagement where beneficial and containment where
necessary. Washington should boost military engagement in the region, upgrade its NSRS, advance cooperation with key partners, and shape China’s global
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ascendance by leveraging its position in Central Asia.
It should consider joining multilateral institutions involving the regional countries and China or seek the
creation of new ones to shape China’s regional activities. It should link its NSRS with China’s “belt” strategy where it benefits the region’s development while
ensuring multidirectional contours of regional geoeconomic forces. It should also start pondering how to
leverage its potential strategic relationship with Iran,
which links the Middle East with Central and South
Asia and shares growing economic ties with China. Finally, it should develop platforms of cooperation with
China in economic and security spheres pertaining to
both global and regional affairs.
As it calibrates its policies as part of the proposed
“Pivot to Eurasia,” the United States should cooperate
with all players of the “Game.” Most importantly, it
has to cultivate “weighty” relations with the Central
Asian countries themselves. It should develop a practical NSRS to position Afghanistan and Central Asia
as an Eurasian trade and transit hub, leaning on and
contributing to similar initiatives of other powers, including China, as long as doing so helps ensure that
no single power emerges to dominate Central Asia politically and militarily. This revitalized strategy would
not merely rely on existing and future economic forces
driven by its potential challengers, but would assume
a direct role for Washington in various projects on national, regional, and cross-regional levels. The United
States would do well to reconfigure the Northern Distribution Network running supplies in and, increasingly, out of Afghanistan, into a more self-sustaining
trade channel linking Central and South Asia following
the full withdrawal of coalition forces from Afghanistan. Staying in the region in a capacity of a significant
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and active economic player would add credibility to
U.S. commitment to regional and global stability. In
the age of growing multipolarity, this commitment
should rest on having an integrated Central and South
Asia serving as a robust transcontinental node and on
ensuing a managed rise of China and India, including
in areas bordering these rapidly expanding powers.
None of these tasks are easy to accomplish. But
if there were any major failure that could characterize U.S. current or future regional policy on China, it
would be Washington’s lost opportunity to connect the
dots by zooming in on the region destined to serve as a
nexus of the U.S. global policy toward traditional and
emerging powers alike. If it sees that interest clearly,
its commitment to achieving it will follow. This work
sheds light on the crucial forces at work, assesses the
possibility and implications of China’s hegemony in
Central Asia, and highlights the need for Washington
to play real politics at the table rather than from across
the high seas.
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CHAPTER I
CHINA’S CURRENT AND
PROJECTED REGIONAL PRESENCE
It is China’s intention to be the greatest power in the
world.
				Lee Kuan Yew.11

China’s Needs, Interests, Goals, and Capabilities.
In his Foreign Affairs article, advisor to Chinese
leadership Zheng Bijian articulated the concept of
China’s “peaceful rise” (later changed to “peaceful
development” to avoid a negative association with
the word “rise”). According to the concept, China
seeks to achieve for itself the status of a great power
without wars that have traditionally marked the rise
to power of other states and by promoting “incremental reforms” and the “democratization of international
relations.”12 This overarching framework has guided
China’s increasingly active foreign policy in Central
Asia, which has largely rested on a deferential treatment of the region’s perceived security guarantor—
Russia. This treatment for the most part concerns
Moscow’s regional security role given China’s needs
to retain Russia as a strategic partner on numerous
global issues.
However, China has no reservations about outperforming Russia economically and has already started
assuming a more confident security role in the region
as it seeks to address the threats of “three evils” (terrorism, extremism, and separatism), prepare Beijing
for a post-2016 Afghanistan, exploit Central Asia’s
vast energy resources and transit potential, and position itself favorably vis-a-via other powers in Eurasia.
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China is especially concerned that a premature exit of
coalition forces from Afghanistan without a durable
solution to the conflict would lead to increased threat
of regional and domestic terrorism and separatism.
Beijing views the possibility of Uygur militants infiltrating restive Xingjian with a particular alarm and has
therefore stepped up its counterterrorism and military
collaboration with SCO partners in Central Asia.
To achieve the aforementioned objectives, Beijing,
in part, relies on the “belt” strategy to develop and
link trade, energy, and transit networks across Eurasia with those in China, as it implements its West
Development Strategy designed to develop Xingjian,
Tibet, and Mongolia, among other provinces. In 2013,
China’s President Xi Jinping signed U.S.$50 billion in
deals with Central Asian counterparts as he unveiled
the “belt” strategy to advance economic integration
across Eurasia from the Pacific to the Baltic Sea. The
choice of “belt” over “road” presumably suggests Beijing’s attempts to showcase its “win-win” approach
and desire to “widen the common ground” with participating countries.13 Months later, Xi announced China’s Maritime Silk Road strategy to complement the
country’s geo-economic push throughout continental
Eurasia. Beijing aims to link the “belt” and maritime
“silk roads” via a planned China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar
Economic Corridor. A third “silk road” initiative that
China is pursuing involves the building of a commercial network through the Arctic.14
Notably, China has called for improving currency
convertibility as part of its economic expansion and
already entered currency swap arrangements with numerous countries as part of its “silk road” initiatives,
including Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan in Central Eurasia and South Korea and Japan in East Asia,
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in order to promote internalization of its currency.15
The focus on currency convertibility is a countermove
to Russia’s own integration initiatives in Eurasia in
response to China’s growing economic influence, as
well as a response to the U.S. dollar-based global trade
system. According to SWIFT’s report, China’s currency, the RMB, was ranked as the 5th most-traded
in the world in 2014, positioning Beijing well in “the
contest for the title of global reserve currency” in the
next few decades.16 China is also leveraging its world’s
largest foreign currency reserves to pursue “going
out” (or “going global”) policy, investing in strategic
industries globally. It is estimated to invest between
U.S.$1-2 trillion overseas by 2020, with Central Asia
being its destination for natural resources and energy
investments.17

Map 1. Proposed China’s Land- and Sea-based
Silk Roads.18
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China seeks to link the “belt” with its other previously announced initiatives that rest on development
of transit and trade infrastructure both within and
outside China. One such mega initiative is to build
a high-speed railway network to facilitate economic
flows across Asia and Europe via Central Asia, linking
17 countries and comprising three major routes connecting Kunming in China with Singapore through
South Asia, Urumqi and Germany via Central Asia,
and Heilongjiang with Southeastern Europe through
Russia. China’s Pan-Asian railway plan is yet another
major project that seeks to link 28 states with 81,000
kilometers of railroads.
Currently, China provides Central Asian countries
with access to East Asia through 11 trade ports, the
second Trans-Eurasia railway, and the UzbekistanKyrgyzstan-Xinjiang highway. It also helped finance
the north-south corridor linking China, Tajikistan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan, and is building a rail
line via Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan,
which will form the Trans-Asia railway network. China further helped construct the north-south road and
the port at Gwadar in Pakistan, facilitating linkages
with Afghanistan, the Arabian Sea, Central Asia, and
Southeast Asia. In 2013, China agreed to build a railroad from China to Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, planning to extend links to China, Turkey, and Iran. “It
is not important for China as to who will be building
this railway line. The most important thing is that it is
built,” Chinese Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan Wang Kaiwen remarked on the U.S.$2 billion project.19 Beijing
has also been actively building roads and highways in
the region, supporting the Western Europe-Western
China International Transit Corridor to improve main
roads linking China and Europe. Notably, Russia
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announced that it would not build its portion of the
line until 2020.20
China’s involvement in the region’s transit infrastructure goes hand in hand with its successful efforts
to invest in the region’s vast energy markets and to
develop energy export routes as alternatives to seabased corridors that navies of major powers control
or could challenge. Together, these efforts facilitate
China’s trade in energy resources, commodities, and
goods across Eurasia, feeding the country’s development and global economic reach. It also reduces China’s dependence on the Indian Ocean and the Strait
of Malacca (which the U.S. and Indian navies patrol)
for energy imports and undercuts the perceived U.S.
policy of “strategic exclusion” of China. In 2011, 77
percent of China’s oil imports passed through the
Strait of Malacca.21 By 2025, the country’s dependence
on oil imports is projected to reach 68.8 percent. China
is not a member of either energy consuming or energy
exporting group of countries, which accentuates the
challenge of accessing material resources and hinders its otherwise faster rise.22 As Ye Hailin with the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences put it:
A big country that builds its prosperity on foreign trade
cannot put the safety of its ocean fleet in the hands of
other countries. Doing so would be the equivalent of
putting its throat under another’s dagger and marking
its blood vessels in red ink.23

Besides being number one or two importer of oil
and mineral resources, China is the number one exporter across a wide variety of goods and depends
heavily on sea-borne trade. In 2011, 60 percent of
China’s trade was sea-borne. Furthermore, its investments grew from U.S.$33.2 billion in 2003 to U.S.$531.8
16

billion in 2012. Meanwhile, the number of its citizens
working overseas skyrocketed from 3.5 million in
2005 to 5.5 million in 2014. These trends call for sufficient military capabilities to not only address but also
prevent threats and attacks on these vital flows.24
In Central Asia, ensuring access to the region’s resources and their safe passage is arguably one of the
major aspects of China’s regional strategy,25 though its
push for the economic “belt” in the region reveals a
rapidly growing need to facilitate exports of China’s
goods to Europe and the Middle East, as well. The share
of the region’s gas climbed to 65 percent of China’s
gas imports, constituting 17.6 percent of China’s gas
consumption in 2012. China also imports almost all of
its uranium from the region.26 Building infrastructure
in Central Asia further allows China to expand the use
of its Xinjiang-Shanghai gas pipeline linking China’s
west and east.27 Potential participation of Japan and
South Korea in this and other projects could foster a
dynamic connection between Central and East Asia,
with China turning into the central node of Eurasia’s
expanding trade, energy, and transit links28—a role it
has been successfully assuming in East Asia and the
Pacific over the last 3 decades. China’s activities in
Central Asia are designed to advance simultaneously
China’s internal development and promote its westward expansion as an aspiring global power.29
China’s economic reach in Central Asia is especially pronounced in Kazakhstan, where its China
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) acquired energy firms Petrokazkahstan for U.S.$4.18 billion and
half of MangistauMunaiGas for U.S.$2.6 billion. It also
bought an 8.33 percent share of Kashagan oil field, the
largest discovered field in the last 3 decades, solidifying its presence in the country’s energy market. China
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provided U.S.$10 billion in loans to Kazakhstan in
2009 during the global financial crisis and, along with
Kazakhstan, launched the Beineu-Bozoi pipeline in
2014 to deliver up to 14 million tons of Kazakh oil to
China annually. As a Kazakh official explained, “The
Chinese have told us quietly but clearly that their energy demands are massive and urgent—and that they
are willing to pay a steep price to address them.”30
In Turkmenistan, China loaned about U.S.$4 billion for developing South Yolotan fields and provided
U.S.$6.7 billion for the construction of the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline with an annual capacity of
40 billion cubic meters that runs via Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan. Beijing and Ashgabat now plan to build
a new pipeline to supply gas to China via Uzbekistan
and Kyrgyzstan. In Uzbekistan, China invests heavily
in the transport market and has become the country’s
second-largest trade partner. In Kyrgyzstan, China is
actively involved in trade facilitation and oil-processing business.31 In Afghanistan, China is focused on
developing transit and trade infrastructure and has
become the country’s largest investor. It won rights
to develop the world’s second-largest undeveloped
copper reserves located in Afghanistan at Aynak—a
project worth U.S.$4.4 billion.32 Beijing also supported
the establishment of the SCO-Afghanistan Contact
Group to promote regional security33 and supported
the SCO’s decision to give Afghanistan observer
status.34
China’s economic and military footprint is bound
to increase in the world and broader Central Asia. This
is not only because of internal conditions calling for
development of China’s western zones as opposed to
saturated markets in advanced coastal areas—itself an
imperative. It is also because China needs a “window”
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to the “West” (yes, this time, China, not Russia; and
the “West” for China is now Europe and the Middle
East) to mitigate its concerns about the U.S. “pivot” on
its eastern flanks and to expand trade across Eurasia
on its western flanks. China cannot afford to lose to
other great powers in Central Asia, not when internal
social expectations demand even more economic miracles from the country that is experiencing growing labor costs and a shift from one economic development
model to another. Other powers try to “reintegrate,”
“reconnect,” or “pivot,” but it is China that observes
quietly and pushes on actively around Eurasia.
China’s growing global economic footprint and increasingly common occurrences of protests, lootings,
killings, and kidnappings that target Chinese nationals and interests have prompted debates in China on
the issue of military development and expansion to
protect its economic interests.35 In a long-expected
move, given its growing security and economic stake
in Central Asia and Afghanistan, in 2014 China agreed
to provide U.S.$6.5 million in military assistance to
Kyrgyzstan and “hundreds of millions of dollars” to
Tajikistan for police uniforms and training.36 In early-2015, China delivered anti-missile defense systems
HQ-9 to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, which became
the first-ever recipients of China’s own-produced
anti-missile defense systems.37 Previously, it provided training, military uniforms, and communications
equipment to Kabul, Dushanbe, and Bishkek. It also
increased the number of military exercises with participation of Central Asian states and its military aid
to the countries’ security sectors.38 The SCO held a total of 13 separate military exercises in each member
state, with the number of personnel ranging from 800
to 10,000.39
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While reflecting a need to boost military capabilities of Central Asian states given the security situation
in Afghanistan, this move also signals the beginning of
a shift in the regional politico-military balances. While
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are not members of the
Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO), both have traditionally relied on Moscowsupplied weapons systems. But China’s growing military aid and sales and economic footprint increasingly
sideline Russia and the United States in Central and
East Asia, respectively.
China increasingly views stability in broader Central Asia and Xingjian as key to its emergence as a
global power, prompting to consider the need for a
long-term military presence in the region to mirror its
relatively more advanced military profile in the east
where it faces an “unruly” Taiwan and menacing U.S.
fleet. These areas, poorly developed as they are, currently serve as barriers to China’s expanded development and security from within. Only by consolidating
itself internally by ensuring a more even economic
development between coastal and continental zones
can China actually mitigate concerns about social implosion and marshal far more advanced internal resources for the pursuit of geo-strategic objectives of
truly global proportions. This is an imperative familiar
to China’s sages and strategists obsessed with questions of unity and prosperity throughout China’s long
history as the world’s only continuous civilization
to date. So far, China’s military advances in Central
Asia have remained limited, even if steadily growing,
including on both bilateral and multilateral levels in
the form of cooperation within the SCO.
The SCO serves as China’s vehicle for promoting
its security role in broader Central Asia. The SCO
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members collaborate against the “three evils” and
seek to ensure regional stability, given volatile security situations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Xingjian.
On occasion, China has used the platform afforded
by the SCO to challenge, along with Russia and the
regional states, the U.S. regional military presence. In
2005, the SCO called for eviction of U.S. military bases from Central Asia. The SCO is also a new concept
and model of security cooperation with which China
is experimenting,40 while trying to deflect negative
perceptions about its growing military capabilities.
The membership of Russia in the organization supports this conclusion, though it also helps the regional
countries and Moscow to shape China’s evolution as
an economic giant and a nascent military force in the
wider region. A Kazakh diplomat pointedly portrayed
the relationship of Russia and China with the SCO as
a “dance of a mongoose and cobra.”41 But, unlike its
economic engagement, China’s military collaboration
with and role in the region has been less aggressive.
China has publicly acknowledged Russia’s predominant security and military role, while slowly building
up its regional military profile. At this stage, it is still
China’s geo-economics that primarily define Beijing’s
rise in Central Asia and the world.
China’s Geo-Economics vs Russia’s Geopolitics.
China and Russia are both dissatisfied with the
global status quo and seek to adjust the U.S.-led international order. This is a strategic objective that binds
the two states as they work, separately and in concert,
to undermine the already weakening U.S. global influence. Both cooperate closely in the United Nations
(UN) Security Council, oppose interventionism (in
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rhetoric anyway), and support state sovereignty while
sharing aversion of and working against U.S. alleged
efforts to project hegemony worldwide. Both are also
concerned about prospects of “color revolutions” that
either occurred or are yet to sweep throughout Eastern Europe, South Caucasus, and Central Asia. Both
have boosted their economic ties in the last decade,
planning to increase bilateral trade to U.S.$200 billion
by 2020. Chinese expert Feng Yujun has described
Russia as the most important country for China’s
diplomacy: both are “neighboring countries, major
powers, and developing countries” which look to expand their “multilateral relations” to dilute U.S. global
influence.42
Be it as it may, Moscow and Beijing also have major
differences, which will surface more clearly as China
expands its capabilities and role in the world and in
Russia’s “zone of privileged interests.” As a Chinese
official responsible for Central Asia policy remarked
on Russia’s treatment of the region as a backyard, “we
understand. But you are supposed, after all, to look
after your own yard, water the flowers.”43 This Russia
has failed to do. Beijing and Moscow are yet to become
more open adversaries and strategic competitors in
what could be a repeat of tensions that existed during
the Cold War. As Chinese scholar Bobo Lo stated:
The Russia-China relationship is neither an authoritarian alliance nor a genuine strategic partnership. It is
a limited partnership sustained by the perception of
mutual is asymmetric gains, and the wisdom to underplay significant differences where they occur. . . .
The question is how long this accommodation can last
. . . . The time will come when the differences between
Russia and China cannot be so easily fudged.44
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The base of power and foreign policy approaches
of China and Russia differ in substance and emphasis.
Both rely on geo-economics and geopolitics as tools
of trade, but Beijing’s approach to national development and foreign affairs has predominantly favored
geo-economics as a tool of statecraft. Russia, on the
other hand, has focused more on geopolitics to advance its national interests. In a way, this division of
labor is mutually reinforcing as it undercuts the perceived U.S. global preeminence using both economic
and geopolitical means. But this division has also impacted the development and strategic potential of the
two great powers differently.
China’s reliance on geo-economics as a tool of
statecraft has achieved far more influence in the conditions of the 21st century than Russia’s persistent grip
on geopolitics, both globally and in Central Asia. President Barack Obama had a point when he described
Russia’s President Vladimir Putin as being stuck in the
19th century. The communist China understood in the
1970s that “opening up” would allow it to modernize
and compete globally. It would also enable China to
amass power to deflect encroachments that had previously humiliated China. As Xiaoping once said, “It
does not matter if it is a black cat or a white cat; if it
catches mice, it is a good cat.”45
Beijing has been effectively and consistently expanding its economic development and influence
globally ever since, becoming the world’s second-largest economy and biggest global trading nation. China
views its sought-after great power status as a way to
redress past injustices and reclaim its lost leadership
position in the global powers hierarchy. As Henry
Kissinger wrote:
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China does not see itself as a rising, but a returning
power. . . . It does not view the prospect of a strong
China exercising influence in economic, cultural, political, and military affairs as an unnatural challenge to
world order—but rather as a return to a normal state
of affairs.46

To achieve this task, China has adhered to policy
advice of Deng Xiaoping and subsequent leaders,
highlighting the need for China to “bide its time,
hide its brightness, not seek leadership, but do some
things.” Put differently, China should avoid costly
geopolitical entanglements and focus on sustaining its
development drive at home. (While Xiaoping did state
that China “. . . will become a big political power if we
keep a low profile . . .,” no evidence reportedly exists
indicating that he used the “bide its time . . .” phrase.47)
As it has enmeshed itself in global trade, China’s economic drive at home has been predicated on its economic expansion abroad. Starting with the collapse
of the Soviet Union and, especially since 2000s, this
expansion has increasingly affected Central Asia. China has been marching west in search of new markets,
resources, investment opportunities and, above all,
ways of reclaiming its position as the central power.
China’s push westward through Moscow’s “backyard” has unnerved Russia. Kremlin is now preoccupied with warding off the U.S. military projection and
Chinese economic expansion in Central Asia. It is concerned not just because of the complexity of the tasks
at hand. Russia also lacks instruments at its disposal
and suffers from a shrinking economic power base. It
has seen its post-Soviet influence erode significantly
due to its imperial foreign policy and authoritarian
domestic politics. In the 1990s, Russia experimented
with liberalization but failed to consolidate demo24

cratic gains and project power effectively at home or
abroad. In the late-1900s and early-2000s, Russia accumulated substantially more wealth and power under
Putin’s leadership. But the sources and fundamentals
of that power continue to rest on petro-revenues and
a skewed economic model favoring energy exports.
Instead of fixing economics and politics at home, Russia resorted to using “hard power” abroad to settle
scores in the 2008 Russian-Georgian war and has relied on geopolitics in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine
after Kyiv refused to join the EU. Western sanctions
on Moscow in response to its seizure of Crimea and
involvement in the Ukrainian conflict and a roughly
60 percent decline in oil prices since June 2014 have
significantly weakened Russia’s economy, causing a
substantial outflow of capital, depreciation of ruble,
and spike in inflation, undercutting its accumulated
wealth and power base.
Meanwhile, Russia’s continued reliance on geoeconomics to expand its influence and its preoccupation with geopolitics have undermined its regional
geo-economic initiatives. Moscow spearheaded the
creation of the EU, which came into force in 2015 and
comprises Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and
Kyrgyzstan. But it has failed to secure participation
of other post-Soviet states. A decision of Ukraine’s
leadership in 2014 to pursue a free trade association
agreement with the European Union rather than join
the EU prompted Moscow to rely on geopolitics to
advance its interests in Ukraine after anti-government
protests in Kyiv forced the pro-Russian Ukrainian
President Viktor Yanukovich to flee. Russia dismembered Ukraine by seizing Crimea and has supported
pro-Russian rebels in the east of Ukraine—the actions
in part motivated by the perceived expansion of the
West and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
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(NATO) to Russia’s borders, both militarily and economically. Given its weak economic base, Russia was
unable to use “soft power” and resorted to the use of
“hard power” to impose its will on neighbors. The
post-Soviet states have not approved Russia’s actions
in Ukraine (despite symbolic statements of support
by a select few under the shadow of Russia’s strong
influence), weakening the appeal of Russia’s security
and economic initiatives, including the EU. While Yerevan and Bishkek decided to join the union, they still
have strong apprehensions about Russia’s intentions,
which the former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton portrayed “as a move to re-Sovietize the region.”48
Like any other major economic project led by a
great power, the EU initiative has a geopolitical subtext—it enables Russia to expand its influence and
guard against Western and China’s encroachments in
the post-Soviet space. The union’s mission to facilitate
free movement of labor, capital, and technologies conflicts with China’s plans to expand trade westward,
allowing Moscow to constrain China’s advances and
explaining its caution in approaching Beijing’s proposal on cooperation between the union and the “belt”
initiatives.49 Whether out of despair or hope, China
and Russia issued a statement in 2014 about China’s
“belt” project:
Russia believes that China’s initiative to form a Silk
Road Economic Belt is very important and highly values the willingness of the Chinese side to keep Russian
interests in mind during its development and implementation.50

Unless Beijing implements its proposed free trade
zone with the union, which Central Asian states could
resist,51 its “belt” project could falter.
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For now, economic trends and statistics demonstrate that China, the gross domestic product (GDP)
of which was five times the size of Russia’s in 2010,
is winning big vis-à-vis Russia in Central Asia. It
has already become the top trading and investment
partner for the region, its trade with Central Asia in
2011 amounting to U.S.$39 billion compared to Russia’s at U.S.$16.5 billion and its foreign direct investment (FDI) hitting U.S.$2.9 billion in 2010 compared
to Russia’s U.S.$3.17 billion. In 2012, China’s trade
with the region reached U.S.$46 billion, 100 times the
amount it was in 1992. Beijing’s energy trade and investments particularly have challenged Russia’s positions in these areas. Russia now seeks to purchase
gas and oil distributions networks to at least control
energy resource deliveries, if not to secure regional oil
and gas fields. In 2015, Russia’s Gazprom announced
a substantial reduction of gas purchases from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, planning to buy four billion cubic meters (cbm) of gas from the former and
up to one billion cbm from the latter, as opposed to
previously planned 10 billion and four billion cbm, respectively. Beginning in 2009, Russia has been reducing purchases of regional gas, just as China has been
buying up and investing throughout the region to secure the production and transit of regional gas to fuel
its growing appetite for energy resources. The same
year, China, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan opened the first-ever regional gas pipeline with
Beijing’s involvement since the collapse of the Soviet
Union, breaking Russia’s long-held monopoly on energy resources and deliveries. China and Kazakhstan
now plan to open a second oil pipeline.
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Figure 1. Gazprom Purchases of Central Asian Gas
from 2007-2013.52
Just as Russia has been leveraging geo-economics
to advance its interests in the post-Soviet space, China
has, too, relied on geopolitical instruments to pursue
its regional agenda. While Beijing lags behind Russia
in promoting its military influence in Central Asia, it
has recently been stepping up its geopolitical involvement by leaning on the SCO framework and bilateral
ties to expand counterterrorism and military collaboration to boost regional security. This is in part due to
the uncertainty surrounding the outcome of the war
in Afghanistan and China’s growing economic stake
in Central and South Asia, where it pursues its “belt”
strategy and economic corridors through Myanmar,
Nepal, and Pakistan. China’s sale of its own new
generation medium-to-long range HQ-9 air defense
systems and its percussion unmanned aerial vehicles
Yilong-1 to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan in return for
reduced gas prices (official reason reported in media)
based on agreements made in 201353 demonstrates its
growing military influence in Central Asia, especially
considering the sophistication of the systems and their
interoperability issues with the predominantly Russiamade and supplied weapons systems. It has also been
training—alongside the United States as a third party
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in another country for the first time—Afghan forces
ahead of the withdrawal of coalition troops.54 The upshot: for the first time in the last 2 centuries Moscow
is constrained to leverage its position in Central Asia
to expand its influence vis-à-vis China or pressure
Beijing as part of the new “Great Game.”55
Unlike Russia, however, China has not secured
military bases in the region. In part, this has to do with
Russia’s overwhelming regional military role; the lack
of a substantial economic stake by China in the region;
and nascent formation of China’s geopolitical interests and perceptions driving decisions on the deployment and use of military force. Moreover, the Chinese
military has not yet developed effective logistics and
combat capabilities for military deployment and basing. In Central Asia, China’s regional geopolitical role
will therefore remain limited in the intermediate term.
China’s involvement in the SCO is there to help, but
the SCO faces a number of challenges constraining the
geopolitical and geo-economic reach of its members.
It enables China to balance against the United States
and Russia, as well as do the same for Russia vis-à-vis
China and the United States. It also helps it advance
economic development, political stability, and security in the region. But the SCO lacks the spirit of multilateralism, with China and Russia preferring bilateral
deals with the regional states to bypass each other’s
opposing responses.
The membership of Central Asian states in the SCO
indicates the “primary constraint of strategic regionalism,” manifesting itself in the desire of these countries
to restrain their more powerful partners and promote
most favorable outcomes given external pressures.
Internal incoherencies and antagonisms within the
SCO thus make it more of a crippled economic and
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political player rather than a geopolitical heavyweight
opposing the United States or NATO. As Ivan Safranchuk, editor-in-chief of the Bolshaya Igra (The Great
Game) magazine put it: “SCO does not intend to oppose the US globally or regionally, so that it operates
not against America, but without it.”56 That said, some
view the SCO as a type of “comprehensive security”
organization that is a China alternative to U.S.-promoted “collective security” alliance structures.57 This
is not to dismiss the appeal of the organization among
a number of countries that have expressed desire to
become members or have already attained some form
of association with the organization. Some even propose that the United States consider becoming a member of the SCO in order to shape China’s and Russia’s
policies in the broader region.58 But this is unlikely to
happen any time soon, if at all, given “cool responses”
to such ideas thus far.59
China’s West-East “Pull” vs India’s
South-North “Push.”
China’s growing presence in Central Asia also worries India—a superpower in the making concerned
about Beijing’s global and regional expansion and
one of the few states capable of challenging China’s
preeminence in the decades ahead.60 Unlike Russia,
which has been projecting its influence in and out of
Central Asia for a century and a half, India is a late
comer to the region’s 21st century “Great Game.” Unlike China, it is starting its ascendance from a lower
base and at a lower rate, explaining its policy failures
and Beijing’s policy successes around the world, including in Central Asia. Despite exhibiting a potentially equal or relatively larger economic and military
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base than China by 2050, today India is a cumbersome
actor constrained by democratic yet highly bureaucratic politics at home and unstable security dynamics
in Pakistan and Afghanistan. It does not share a border with Central Asia. Nor has it managed since the
collapse of the Soviet Union to improve substantially
its trade links with the region due to tensions with
Pakistan and lingering instability in Afghanistan.61
Delhi views its presence in Central Asia as critical for
ascendance to the ranks of great powers, but it cannot
accomplish this task without resolving the security
challenges limiting its ambitions. India will therefore
remain largely confined to South Asia and the Indian
Ocean in the intermediate term.
This is not to discount India’s plans to gain deeper
foothold in Central Asia. In 2012, it launched the “Connect Central Asia” policy to link South and Central
Asia via energy, trade, and transit corridors in what
conceptually resembles the U.S. NSRS, designed to
develop and position Afghanistan as a hub of Central
and South Asian integration. While a latecomer in the
region, India is not unwelcome among Central Asian
countries that are eager to diversify their ties and secure
access to the Indian sub-continent and Indian Ocean.
According to Shri Ahamed, Indian Minister of State
for External Affairs, the “connect” policy “is based on
pro-active political, economic and people-to-people
engagement with Central-South Asian countries, both
individually and collectively.” As part of the policy,
India plans to set 14 flight links with the Central Asian
states, develop local information technology, energy,
banking, and pharmaceutical industries, and to build
energy infrastructure and e-networks linking Central
and South Asia.62 India’s intent to build the NorthSouth Transit Corridor via Uzbekistan is crucial in
this regard.
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In Kazakhstan, Indian firms are actively involved
in coal, oil, and uranium industries. As of 2014, India
imported more than 3,500 tons of uranium from Kazakhstan since 2009. In Tajikistan, Indian companies
are involved in a hydropower project, a reflection of
importance India attaches to the region’s hydro-energy capacity for the CASA-1000 initiative bringing electricity from Central to South Asia. In Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan, Delhi plans to open an Indian-Central Asia
University and a military hospital, respectively.
In Uzbekistan, its companies are present in the
pharmaceuticals, information technology, construction, energy, and mining sectors. As the world’s sixth
largest energy consumer, it is also a major party to the
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas
pipeline project, seeking an active role in the development of the region’s energy reserves to reduce its
dependence on energy imports from the Middle East
and meet its long-term economic growth projections.
Delhi has recently expressed interest in building a gas
pipeline from southern Kazakhstan to India, as well.
However, instability in Pakistan and Afghanistan and
the standoff between Iran and the West have impeded
India’s efforts to import energy resources from Central Asia and Iran (via proposed Iran-Pakistan-India
gas pipeline).63
India’s economy, projected to overtake that of
China’s around 2050, requires access to vast energy
resources of Central Asia, where China’s energy presence is more pronounced. In 2013, India failed to secure
an 8.4 percent stake in Kashagan oil field, which Kazakhstan gave to China for the same amount of U.S.$5
billion. The deal was one of about 20 agreements between China and Kazakhstan worth U.S.$30 billion.
Beijing also outperformed Delhi in securing rights to
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develop the Galkynysh gas field in Turkmenistan and
launching a pipeline in 2009 to supply Turkmen gas to
China. India does have its hopes pinned on the long
over-due construction of TAPI, which would boost its
presence in the region’s energy market. But parties to
the project have thus far failed to kickstart the project
for financial and security reasons. The implementation
of TAPI would not only serve as a milestone of India’s
“connect” policy, but would also facilitate improvement in the Pakistani-Indian relations, as well as advance stabilization, development, and integration of
Afghanistan with the broader region, enabling India to
project a much more meaningful geopolitical presence
in Central Asia. It would also challenge EU’s interests
in accessing the Caspian energy resources, undermine
Russia’s remaining control over the regional energy
exports, and help the Central Asian states diversify
their ties in order to balance China.
But to gain unimpeded access to Central Asia, India has to ensure the development and integration of
Afghanistan into the broader region—a critical component of India’s “connect” policy. Delhi plans to
invest U.S.$100 million to develop the Iranian port at
Chabahar and connect it to Afghanistan and on to India via railways and roads. It has already spent at least
U.S.$136 million to connect the port with the “Ring
Road” in Afghanistan, the deposits of which are estimated to range from U.S.$1-3 trillion. India has invested U.S.$2 billion in Afghanistan’s infrastructure over
the last decade and sought to develop the country’s
Hajigak and other deposits. The port would enable
Delhi to access Central Asian markets without relying
on Pakistan and position it favorably vis-à-vis China,
which helped build a rival Pakistani port at Gwadar
linking China and the Persian Gulf. The Chabahar
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port is but one link in the India’s North-South Transit Corridor connecting Indian-built Zaranj-Delaram
highway in Afghanistan and providing an outlet for
India’s goods to Central Asia. In case of entente between Iran and the West, the corridor would facilitate
India’s trade with the region, expanding a north-south
vector of the transcontinental trade.64 Besides its funding for roads, railways, medical facilities, power networks, and other socio-economic infrastructure, India
helped Afghanistan become a member of the South
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation to facilitate the country’s development and integration with
the region.
India’s involvement in Afghanistan and Central
Asia is not confined to economic development priorities alone. India views Central Asia as a geopolitical
prize in the contest for global primacy, perceiving
China’s maritime and continental expansion as a
double-threat to its plans to emerge as a global power. Just as China views the U.S. “Pivot to the Pacific”
and military presence in Central Asia as containing
China’s rise along its perimeter, so does Delhi consider China’s engagement with India’s neighbors as a
stratagem to contain India. Beijing has been effectively
building strategic ties with countries surrounding India, boosting cooperation with Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar to India’s northeast; Sri-Lanka,
Thailand, and Malaysia to India’s southeast; Pakistan
and Afghanistan to India’s northwest; and Central
Asian states to India’s northwest. The 1962 border war
with China and unresolved political tensions with
Beijing have also driven this perception, making the
emergence of a friendly “Chindia” capable of jointly
reshaping the global system to suit the needs of the
two giants a far-fetched scenario.65
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To undermine China’s attempts to do so in Central
Asia and achieve its other objectives, Delhi has cooperated with the regional states and Afghanistan against
Taliban in the 1990s and after the events of September
11, 2001 (9/11). It has developed a strong relationship
with Uzbekistan as its major arms supplier, opened a
mountain biomedical research center in Kyrgyzstan,
sought rights to the use of the Ayni airbase in Tajikistan, assisted with training of the Kazakh Caspian
Fleet, and has plans to participate for the first time in
counterterrorism exercises with Kyrgyz special forces
in Kyrgyzstan.66 However, India’s poor relationship
with Pakistan—China’s ally in South Asia—and the
volatile security situation in Afghanistan have prevented it from assuming an even more active military
and security role in greater Central Asia, forcing it to
apply more effort compared to China.
Despite their somewhat tense relations, India and
China have been notably improving their ties over the
last 3 decades, with an increase in bilateral trade being a vivid demonstration of this development that
may yet translate into more friendly relations. As Chinese Premier Wen Jibao remarked, India and China
had conflicts only briefly in the 2,000-year history of
exchanges, and the bilateral relations have been 99.9
percent friendly.67 But the geography and projected
geopolitical dynamics currently position the two powers as rivals, forcing India to rethink its long-standing
grand strategy of pursuing a strictly autonomous role
in world affairs.
India’s positioning as an autonomous actor and unwillingness to be a perceived U.S. “pawn”68 has in part
contributed to its limited role and presence in Central
Asia. India’s trade with the region was just U.S.$500
million in 2012, compared to China’s at U.S.$29 bil-
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lion. In 2010, trade between Russia and Central Asia
was € (euros) 7 billion, making Moscow the third largest trade partner after China and the EU. India gained
an SCO observer status to enhance its regional influence, but it sees few prospects for productive interaction within the group. It perceives China as seeking to
block its membership and prevent it from attempting
an active engagement in Central-South Asia. India’s
relative failure in projecting comparable influence in
Central and South-East Asia, as well as concerns about
China’s policy of containment, have prompted Delhi
to start reconsidering its obsession with the nonalignment positioning in international affairs and enhancing strategic cooperation with the United States. In
2015, Delhi and Washington concluded an additional
deal on nuclear energy and are perceived as working
together to keep China’s global rise in check.
India’s relatively limited global and regional roles
also have to do with the fact that India is the last major
Asian economy to join the Asian economic renaissance.
Its latecomer status in part resulted from a skewed
view of the leadership that considered the success of
others “as largely irrelevant to its own future” and favored the “continuation of existing policies.”69 India,
in the 1990s and 2000s, started advancing economic
reforms with a view to unleash private forces to attain
a more efficient economic development, but it did so
a couple of decades after China, not to say anything
about other South-East Asian countries. It did so in an
external environment that saw the collapse of the Soviet Union, ever-expanding U.S.-led global economic
integration, and the risk of “increasing marginalization” if it failed to reform. As one commentator put it,
“We felt as though our second independence had arrived: we were going to be free from a rapacious and
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domineering state.” By the end of the 20th century,
India had become one of the fastest growing economies, providing it with a platform to start projecting
influence in post-Soviet Central Asia.70 Still, India’s
more democratic system and favorable labor dynamics present it with a number of long-term advantages
over China that could become obvious by 2050 or
earlier.71
On balance, India’s south-north “push” will continue to be less pronounced than China’s west-east
geo-economic “pull.” India is in a tough rivalry with
old and new players. However, Delhi has committed
itself to enhancing the development and stability of
Afghanistan and reconnection of Central and South
Asia, undertaking major initiatives to achieve these
objectives. The resolution of the security and economic challenges centered on Afghanistan and Pakistan
would lead to a more active and influential regional
role by India in the future. China’s interest in developing links between the Middle East and Central-South
Asia and growing economic cooperation with India
would, too, facilitate India’s regional policy if Delhi
plays the Pakistan card right. To make its “push”
deeper, India needs to enhance strategic cooperation
with the United States and other actors in Central
Asia, while better exploiting its long-term advantages
over China.
China’s Expansion vs U.S. Containment?
China’s expansion into Central Asia puts a question mark on the U.S. status as a superpower and
protector of the global order. Ironically, U.S. efforts
to promote globalization and global order have facilitated China’s global rise ever since the signing of
a Shanghai Communique in 1972, which facilitated
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China’s external integration and improved ties with
Washington. Beijing has tapped into globalization
ever since, leveraging its reforms to achieve for itself
the status of the world’s second largest economy and
biggest trading nation today. If no profound shifts in
its socio-economic conditions put it off track, China
is poised to overtake the United States as the world’s
largest economy in the next few years in terms of total
GDP. By around 2050, it may well overtake the United
States as the world’s largest economy in terms of GDP
per capita.
China’s economic expansion has given it a sense of
pride and opportunity to redress the “humiliation” it
had suffered at the hands of Japan and Western powers
in the previous 2 centuries. While it largely continues
to “bide its time and capabilities” and pursue “peaceful development,” in recent years Beijing has occasionally displayed an assertive stance toward neighbors,
as frictions have intensified with Japan, Vietnam, and
the Philippines over contested ownership of islands in
the South and East China Seas. Such posturing, while
tempered down time and again, has evoked fears of
China’s economic drive being complemented by China’s growing military prowess that some fear Beijing
is expected to display more assertively when the period of its “strategic opportunity” ends. The Chinese
leadership defines this period as the first 20 years of
the 21st century, reflecting recognition in Beijing of a
unique opportunity presented by external and internal environment for China to achieve major strategic
gains in economic and military development.72 Specifically, by 2020 China wants to quadruple the GDP
it had in 2000 and to become “a mid-level developed
economy by 2050.”73
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China is also making strides in the military field.
Its defense spending is now the second-largest after
the United States, measuring U.S.$106 billion in 2012.
If all goes according to plan, China is likely to attain
“moderate, evolutionary gains in the ability of air,
ground, and maritime forces to conduct joint, offensive operations abutting China’s maritime and land
borders” by 2020.74 In its 2010 report to U.S. Congress,
the Department of Defense stated this about China’s
military capabilities:
Earlier this decade, China began a new phase of military development by articulating roles and missions
for the People’s Liberation Army that go beyond China’s immediate territorial interests. Some of these missions and associated capabilities . . . appear designed
to improve the PLA’s [People’s Liberation Army]
ability for extended-range power projection, although
China’s ability to sustain military power at a distance
today remains limited.75

The rise of China’s military follows its growing
economic footprint, which forces readjustments in the
military capabilities and missions to protect China’s
interests. Given the country’s dependence on maritime
domain for imports of strategically vital resources and
exports of goods, China’s navy, rather than the army,
is expected to “go global” first. At this stage, however,
only the missile, space, and cyber capabilities enable
China to project power globally.76 In his China Dream,
PLA Senior Colonel Liu Mingfu sees a “grand goal”
of China in “becoming number one in the world”—
a task requiring China to displace the United States.
As China rises economically, he writes, it needs to rise
militarily so as to win in a struggle over primacy.77 In
response, nations from Vietnam and Japan to New
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Zealand and Australia have stepped up their cooperation with the United States, which remains committed
to security of the global commons and its partners in
the Pacific but has fewer resources to accomplish these
objectives due to the shift in global power “from the
West to the Rest.” This, in turn, has prompted fears in
Beijing that Washington is seeking to contain China’s
rise by revitalizing old and building new alliances.
China’s ascendance is exerting tremendous pressure on the global economic and security system,
forcing reconfiguration of international relations, especially in East Asia and increasingly Central Asia, as
well. These developments have prompted efforts by
Washington to “rebalance” to Asia as part of its “Pivot to Asia-Pacific” launched in 2012. From a policy of
containment since 1949 and engagement since 1969,
the United States has effectively pursued a China policy displaying elements of both containment and engagement since 1989. Some describe the U.S. current
strategy toward China as “congagement,”78 which
does not contradict the U.S. “pivot” strategy because
Washington continues to engage Beijing. China has
countered the U.S. “pivot” by initiating in 2013 its
own “pivot” in the form of overland and maritime
“silk road” initiatives in East and Central Asia79 and
by enhancing pressures toward multi-polarity in the
international system. With its BRIC (Brazil, Russia,
India, and China) partners, China has been seeking
to adjust or create alternative economic and security
institutions, challenging the structure created by the
West in the wake of World War II.
Having established the SCO in Central Asia, which
excludes the United States, China seeks to create a
new security architecture without U.S. participation
in broader Asia. As Xi stated at a conference in 2014,
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“It is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia,
solve the problems of Asia, and uphold the security of
Asia.”80 But it is in the economic area where it has most
succeeded. Along with BRICS (BRIC plus South Africa)
nations, China launched the New Development Bank
(NDB) with the initial capitalization of U.S.$100 billion in order to level the playing field where the World
Bank (WB), with capitalization of U.S.$223 billion and
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have traditionally reigned supreme. It also spearheaded the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) with capitalization of at least U.S.$160 billion, which aims to have
57 founding members by the end of 2015, challenging
the Asian Development Bank led by the United States
and Japan.81 Britain’s application in 2015 to join AIIB
has displeased Washington, promoting a U.S. official
to say that the United States is “wary about a trend
toward constant accommodation of China.”82 China
also issued U.S.$10 billion more in loans than the WB
in 2008-10 through its China Development Bank.83 It
also supported the Chiang Mai Initiative, which has
challenged the position of the IMF by seeking to create a regional lender of last resort. To acknowledge
China’s growing contribution to world economy, the
IMF increased China’s voting share by 15 percent, and
the WB appointed a senior Chinese economist as its
chief economist for the first time.84
While these developments for the time being support Robert Kaplan’s conclusion that East Asia is generally all about business, China’s economic drive is
bound to shift gears in regional capitals.85 True, economic imperatives have often prevailed over geopolitics in Asia in the last 3 decades.86 But this is about to
change in the next 3, as China translates its economic
capabilities into military power and prompts more
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focus on geopolitics in the neighborhood increasingly
uneasy about China’s rise. Already, Japan is debating
its self-defense clause, which may open the way for a
more active security role by Tokyo. India, a member
of the “nuclear club” but not of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, is starting to assume a role of Washington’s
strategic partner in ensuring a peaceful rise of China
and a stable global order. Delhi and Washington signed
a Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement in 2006, and
India may soon start importing nuclear reactors and
fuel from the United States. The deal is critical because
it enables Washington to help Delhi develop ballistic
and anti-ballistic missile technology.87 Vietnam, no
longer facing a full arms embargo by Washington,
looks forward to U.S arms supplies, while relying on
Russia as a major arms supplier and building stronger
defense ties with India.88
While the relationships are important, it is the relationship between China and the United States that
will be the defining factor in the transition of power
away from the West and evolution of global order.
One can describe the U.S.-China relationship as a
“competitive co-existence,” with both countries suffering from the deficit of “strategic trust.”89 Should the
United States contain or engage China? Unlike during the Cold War, when it misapplied the concept of
containment developed by George Kennan to keep the
Soviet Union in check, the United States today is in an
intertwined economic relationship with China that enjoys strong and growing economic ties with U.S. allies
in Asia and Europe. China is thus more likely to deflect than succumb to any U.S. containment.90 Washington would be unable to alter the balance of power
and contain Beijing without undermining one’s own
economic base. By the same token, any of China’s attempts to exclude the United States from Asia would
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face resistance from Washington and Asian states unwilling to see their region dominated by China.91 This
does not mean that the former will not attempt containment or that the latter will not seek hegemony. As
John Mearsheimer asserts:
It is clear from the historical record that American
policy makers never tolerate peer competitors. Therefore the United States can be expected to go to great
lengths to contain China and ultimately weaken it to
the point where it is no longer capable of ruling the
roost in Asia. In essence, the United States is likely to
behave towards China much the way it behaved towards the Soviet Union during the Cold War. 92

China, according to Mearsheimer, in turn would
likely follow in the steps of “all previous potential
hegemons” and would “be strongly inclined to become a real hegemon,”93 developing its own Monroe Doctrine as another Asian power, Japan, once
did in the 1930s.94 China’s experience of once being
the predominant force in the world and Asia and its
potential to emerge as the world’s largest economic
force may indicate its intention to displace the United
States from its position of leadership in Asia, if not the
world.95 Ultimately, if neither the United States, nor
China pursue an accommodation and peaceful power
transition, the international system should ready itself
for a collision of major magnitude. According to longcycle theorists, power shifts occur approximately every 100 years, with most power transitions leading to
wars between the dominant state(s) and rising state(s)
and, usually, resulting in the emergence of a new set
of dominant states for the next century.96 Regardless
of how the winner is in this scenario, the related repercussions for global development and security would
be far-reaching.
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If one were to assume that Washington seeks to
contain Beijing and the latter seeks to expand vis-à-vis
the United States, one may conclude that “China has
done better at constraining America’s response to its
rise than America has done in transforming China.”97
Unlike China, the United States is short on financial
resources, being forced as it is to cut defense spending to reduce its U.S.$0.5 trillion deficit and U.S.$18
trillion sovereign debt. It cut its defense budget by
U.S.$37 billion in 2013 and is expected to see a decline
of 20 percent by 2022, which would further undercut the “pivot” strategy.98 Trillions spent on wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan have aggravated the fiscal challenges. While Washington invested “blood and treasure” as part of these wars, China has been investing
funds and importing oil and mineral resources from
both countries, expanding its economic stake while
Washington was doing the “heavy lifting.”99 To make
matters worse, China is now the U.S. largest foreign
holder of U.S. public debt (U.S.$1 trillion).100 Fixing
the fiscal challenges is a now a major national security
imperative for the United States if it wants to avoid
the fate of other great powers—the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR), the United Kingdom (UK),
Spain, and Rome, among others.
With the U.S. “Pivot to the Pacific” and China’s
expansion and consolidation of its strategic position
in Asia, Beijing finds it timely to march westward
through Central Asia in search of resources to equalize its internal development, expand its global economic footprint, and deflect U.S. pressure in the east.
Unfortunately for Washington, its economic influence
in Central Asia is insignificant and its regional military role is under question, as U.S.-led coalition forces
plan to withdraw from Afghanistan by 2016. China,
in turn, sees Central Asia as an outlet for its untapped
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development and expansion years after it has displayed a leading economic position in Southeast Asia.
As one Chinese analyst noted, “If Southeast Asia is
our front yard, then Central Asia is our backyard.”101
China is actively pursuing its “belt” initiative, which
overshadows the NSRS in reach and commitment and
ensures for Beijing a more lasting military presence.
While the “belt” feeds into U.S. strategy of enhancing global connectivity, it also serves to buttress the
“comprehensive national power” of the country that
may emerge as the world’s largest economic and military power by 2050 and 2100, respectively. Why is this
all important? Central Asia is of strategic importance
to U.S. allies in Europe and Asia and for the U.S. ability
to sustain its leading position and global order amid
the rise of new centers of power that are encroaching
on Central Asia. Washington should be prepared to
shape China’s ascendance and engage Beijing, while
pushing forward on both fronts—in the Asia-Pacific
and Central Asia.
To preserve the sinews of the international system,
the United States needs to involve China in adjusting
the system, with or without prompting from Beijing.
This requires that Washington increasingly engage
China’s allies and potential challengers in institutional settings early on. Unfortunately, the U.S. record
in building institutions and partnerships in East Asia
is much more impressive than in Central Asia. As a
sea-based power that defeated Japan in World War II,
the United States is far more comfortable in the AsiaPacific where it has built a network of allies and shares
much stronger economic ties. Since 1945 until today,
no other Asian power, not even Japan, had questioned
U.S. military preeminence in the region. To this date,
Washington continues to support the pursuit of multilateral economic and military institutions in East Asia.
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In Central Asia, on the other hand, the U.S. institutional influence and country partnerships are weak.
Even the collapse of the USSR and 9/11 may prove to
be fleeting drivers of its presence in the region, where
Russia’s predominant security role and China’s growing economic influence have impeded U.S. efforts to
“grow roots” in Central Asia. Washington may not
care much about its economic stake in the region, but
it should surely be concerned about regional economic and military dynamics that impact its global position. Unlike China, which led the creation of the SCO,
reinvigorated the Kazakhstan-initiated Conference
on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in
Asia organization, and launched the “belt” project in
Central Asia, the United States has largely failed to
create, sustain, or involve itself in new or reshaped
regional institutions. Washington negotiated Trade
and Investment Framework Agreements, advanced
the TAPI and Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) projects,
and promoted NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP)
programs. It has also advanced the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) running supplies to and out
of Afghanistan, proposed the creation of a counternarcotics initiative, and launched the NSRS. Aside from
the BTC and NDN, the other initiatives have either not
materialized or failed to advance U.S. global interests
effectively. The BTC and NDN have fostered the integration of the Caspian and Central-South Asia with
the global economy, but the U.S. role in sustaining
the NDN legacy and unleashing the NSRS potential is
unclear after withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan. To shape China’s global rise, Washington needs
to have a regional presence in Central Asia, where
China’s “pull” is setting the direction for the reconfiguration of the region’s geopolitical space.
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CHAPTER II
RECONFIGURATION OF CENTRAL ASIA’S
GEOPOLITICS
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold. . . .
			

W. B. Yeats, 1919.102

Multidirectional “Push-Pull” Forces.
Forces exerted by major powers advance reconfiguration of Central Asia’s geopolitics at a pace and
extent much more rapid and profound than was the
case after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia today is a much stronger actor than the Russia in the
1990s, seeking to revitalize its influence by absorbing
post-Soviet states through the Moscow-led EU. The
United States, which had been an outsider during the
Cold War, successfully inserted itself into the broader
region as a major military force after 9/11 and has
been facilitating the opening up of economic corridors
of Eurasia ever since. The EU has partially managed
to reorient the Caspian states closer to Europe in the
energy sphere. China has already significantly altered
the region’s economic flows over the last 2 decades
and is yet to reshape the region’s security architecture.
India has finally awakened, pushing itself north as it
seeks to connect Central and South Asia via Afghanistan. While still lagging behind China, it has committed to expanding its regional presence by launching
its “connect” policy. Even Iran is now increasingly
optimistic about its growing influence in Central Asia
given hopes of improved relations with the United
States. Other middle powers are also impacting the
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regional scene. Alas, the regional republics have, for
the most part, acquiesced with proposed or imposed
external visions, failing to advance their own vision of
their own region in concert, despite clear benefits of
intra-regional cooperation.
All of these “push-pull” forces are simultaneously
gluing and tearing the region apart, potentially creating conditions for uncontrolled geopolitical competition, arms race, militarization, and war. Russia drags
the region north; India pulls it south; the EU, west; the
United States, west and south; and China, east. At this
stage, neither power is wielding an overwhelming
influence across all domains, allowing Central Asian
states to withstand pressures from any single power.
But China’s rise today, and India’s ascendance in various dimensions of power and influence in the long
term, are bound to transform the regional landscape
beyond recognition if current dynamics hold. In this
case, the failure of Central Asian states to organize
collectively and promote intra-regional integration
would prove an omission that had traditionally cost
them dearly during imperial expansions by Russia
starting in the 19th century and China under various
dynasties. Only a strong center, a pole of intraregional
organization, can withstand these pressures and mitigate the conditions that could lead to open external
rivalries and internal wars.
Of all these pressures, China’s rise is more multifaceted and powerful, promising to tilt the balance
of power further in favor of Beijing, as neighboring
China expands its global and regional footprint in the
next few decades. Already, the region’s shifting economic flows—aid, energy, investment, transit, and
trade—indicate that China’s “pull” on Central Asia is
a stronger force, realigning the region along an east-
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ern vector. China’s trade turnover with Central Asia
stands at about 29.6 percent and is growing (compared to the EU’s at 26.4 percent and Russia’s at 18.3
percent).103
In itself, China’s economic expansion is a boon for
the Central Asian countries that necessarily should
leverage China’s influence as they pursue their development and external economic integration. But an
expanded economic influence of a neighboring power
inevitably comes with economic, political, and security challenges. An expanded political and military influence of such power could threaten the sovereignty
or make-up of the regional countries. It is this threat
that should prompt regional actors, from both within
and outside the region, to organize and shape China’s
regional ascendance. As they do so, the Central Asian
states and their partners should not contain but engage China in a set of institutions strong enough to
check China’s ambitions for domination in check. This
in part entails pursuing a policy of “multilateralism”
similar to China’s own approach increasingly emphasizing “regionalism” and “multilateralism.”
China’s involvement in regional institutions seeks
to ensure that the United States does not contain China
and that members of these structures are not concerned
about China’s rise, while exposing U.S. alleged unilateralism and China’s contrasting approach of multilateralism in foreign affairs.104 By pursuing “multilateral
regionalism,” China advances institution building,105
prevents or mitigates collective counter-response, and
experiments with designs and leadership roles as it
rises to the ranks of most powerful.106 Its track record
of building or supporting the creation of regional institutions in Asia speaks for itself. China has successfully launched or supported the creation of SCO, Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) plus
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Three (ASEAN: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao
People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar,
the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam;
plus the People’s Republic of China, Japan, and Korea), ASEAN Plus Six (Australia, China, India, Japan,
New Zealand, and South Korea), NDB, and AIIB.107
While these efforts demonstrate China’s intention to
create alternative institutions, thereby challenging the
established rules of the game, they also indicate China’s desire to be included rather than excluded and
its plans to play a role of a common denominator in
global and regional affairs.
The Central Asian states and their partners should
use the same trick on China; by organizing from
within, and involving China in select existing or new
institutions, they would make the reconfiguration of
the region’s geopolitics a more balanced and stable
process. This would help them advance multivector
foreign policies, guard against external encroachments on their newly-found sovereignties, and facilitate their economic development. This would also
serve China’s goal of making its rise less threatening,
while committing Beijing to common rules of engagement in the rapidly changing region.108 This is critical
because China’s rise will prompt other powers to respond to China’s advances, potentially exacerbating
the already ongoing external rivalries over influence
in the region. In the process, the Central Asian states
should take advantage of the division of labor among
external players to ensure that the region’s geopolitical reconfiguration is not a one-sided process driven
by a single all-powerful actor, and that no need arises
for a “second coming” (in case of a regional or global
war starting out of Central Asia).
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Division of Labor in Central Asia.
Varying agendas and capabilities of great powers
that underpin the “push-pull” forces in the region reveal a peculiar division of labor in Central Asia. It is
peculiar, not because there is no single power wielding a comprehensive array of influences across economics, security, and military areas in the region. It
is peculiar because China gradually emerges as the
power increasingly projecting influence across all of
these categories at the same time. China’s economic
influence is already predominant in Central Asia,
and its influences and roles in cultural, political,
and security developments of the broader region are
growing rapidly.
Russia remains the guarantor of the regional security order, relying on the CSTO and bilateral ties to
advance regional security and Moscow’s influence. In
2012, it secured a deal with Kyrgyzstan to extend the
lease of CSTO airbase in Kant for 15 years in exchange
for writing off about U.S.$500 million of Kyrgyzstan’s
debts. In addition to the CSTO base, Moscow operates
a naval test site at Issyk Kul Lake in Kyrgyzstan, maintains its largest overseas base hosting up to 7,000 personnel in Tajikistan, and a space station at Kazakh city
of Baikanur. In 2013, Moscow and Tajikistan agreed
to extend Russia’s military presence at the base for 3
decades. Russia also pursues growing defense ties focused on joint anti-missile defense with Kazakhstan,
which it shares the world’s longest border.
But while Russia’s security role and presence are
paramount, they are not unchallenged. Unlike Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which are the largest recipients
of Russia’s military aid in Central Asia, Uzbekistan
and Turkmenistan shun Russia-led “collective” se-
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curity institutions, “flirting” with the United States
and China to offset Moscow’s influence. Uzbekistan
and Turkmenistan are both members of the China-led
SCO, which pursues a struggle against “three evils”
and holds frequent military exercises. Both countries
also purchased China’s first-ever anti-missile defense
systems HQ-9 in early-2015, about the same time
the United States announced a donation of approximately 300 armored vehicles to Uzbekistan. For China
that has traditionally stayed away from providing
sophisticated weaponry to the regional states, doing
so today signals its growing confidence in enhancing
its security and military role in Central Asia, even if
one considers its actions as having Moscow’s “green
light” and seeking to mitigate security risks emanating from Afghanistan. In 2007 and 2009, China offered
U.S.$3 million in loans to Turkmenistan to boost its
capability against militant attacks on energy infrastructure and U.S.$3.7 million to Uzbekistan to install
mobile scanning systems at border crossings due to
instability in Afghanistan.109
To fight the “three evil forces,” China even considered the possibility of having a military base in
southern Kyrgyzstan in 2005110—5 years before Russia
and the CSTO failed to respond to inter-ethnic clashes
that displaced thousands and killed hundreds in Kyrgyzstan. It later emerged that, aside from Russia’s and
CSTO’s own constraints, it was China’s and Uzbekistan’s objection to the presence of Russian troops close
to their borders that prevented the deployment of
Russia’s or CSTO forces during and after the clashes.
China also had its eyes on the Karshi-Khanabad base
in Uzbekistan, which the Soviet Union built to address
potential threats from China during the Cold War,111
but has failed to secure it in part due to Moscow’s
opposition.112
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That China has publicly recognized Russia’s preeminent security and military role in Central Asia
brings forth a few important points. First, China is interested, for the time being, in a strategic partnership
with Russia to advance multipolarity and constrain
the United States globally. Second, China wants to
facilitate its economic expansion in Central Asia without drawing major opposition from Moscow, whose
long-term economic influence is receding. Third,
China understands its inability to assume the role of
the region’s security guarantor, let alone pursue it effectively. With Afghanistan teetering on the brink of
collapse and the need to secure Xingjian from militants, Beijing has no other way but to view Moscow
and Washington as short-term partners. Finally, the
very fact of the public acknowledgement reflects the
increasingly wide and correct perception, especially
in Kremlin, of Beijing’s growing security and military
clout in the region.
Besides pushing aside Russia in the security sphere,
China is also steadily stepping on the U.S. regional
military role that has primarily focused on Afghanistan. Neither nearby Russia, nor neighboring China
can currently assume this role. In fact, both Moscow
and Beijing have been occasionally displeased with
the planned withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan. They perceive the U.S. war effort as a failure
that could lead to deterioration of regional security if
Washington does not ensure a responsible conclusion
of the military mission. They are specifically alarmed
at the prospect of substantial destabilization of Afghanistan after 2016 and likely expanded inflows of
refugees, militants, and drugs into Central Asia, Russia, and China.113 Reports of the Islamic State militants
gaining foothold in Central-South Asia present additional security concerns.
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This is part why, after years of “free riding,” Beijing is stepping up its security role by training Afghan
national police forces, working with Pakistan to bring
mutually beneficial security outcomes, and boosting
anti-terrorism cooperation and military sales to the
Central Asian states bordering Afghanistan, where it
has a growing stake in mineral deposits and transit
infrastructure. Given its strong leverage on Pakistan
and history of “quiet” cooperation with the Taliban
in 1990s, China even proposed mediating between
coalition forces and the Taliban.114
Despite these efforts, China’s military role in Afghanistan—in addition to its covert and overt role
in the country in conjunction with Pakistan—is only
starting to shape up. Unlike Central Asian countries,
where China faces Russia as the major military actor,
Afghanistan could present for Beijing an opportunity
to experiment with its military designs due to planned
withdrawal of U.S. forces from that country. At this
time, China is more likely to entertain this possibility
through its proxy, Pakistan, while increasing military
aid to Kabul in the form of training, weapons, and intelligence sharing. This is because China is cautious
not to aggravate the already tense relations with its
strategic rival in the face of India and not to stir the nest
of radicalism crisscrossing Pakistan and Afghanistan
and inviting yet another historical struggle between
an “infidel” empire and righteous “freedom fighters.”
This is not to discount China’s interest in seeing the U.S. military in the region gone as far as the
eye can see. From a longer-term perspective, Beijing
views U.S. regional military activities as flanking and
encircling China from the east and the west—a scenario its seeks to avoid by enhancing its security and
military role in Afghanistan without committing to
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exceedingly costly endeavors just yet. Beijing therefore views with content the SCO’s decision in 2005 to
call for withdrawal of U.S. bases from Central Asia;
the closure of the U.S. base at Kharshi-Khanabad in
Uzbekistan the same year following U.S. criticism of
Tashkent’s crackdown in Andijan; and the recent termination of U.S. base operations in Kyrgyzstan, even
if under pressure from Russia.
In addition to demonstrating its growing security
and military influence vis-à-vis Russia and the United
States, China is bringing competition to the EU’s development agenda and India’s energy forays in the
broader region. With respect to the former, Beijing
has substantially increased its aid inflows and investments into Central Asia without conditioning them
on political or economic liberalization. What China
wants in return is an opportunity to do business. The
lack of transparency and checks and balances in Central Asian states, and in China itself, make Beijing’s
approach to foreign assistance a relatively more effective tool, if not necessarily and always beneficial for
the long-term economic and political development of
the regional countries.
Unlike India, China has attained a more demarcated role and meaningful presence in Central Asia.
This is not to dismiss India’s decision to institutionalize its vision for the region through its “connect”
policy, boost its military and economic presence by
seeking to set up its first-ever overseas military base in
Tajikistan, and launch the TAPI pipeline linking Central and South Asia. Of all these deals, Delhi has made
more progress on TAPI, whose members are close to
starting construction. But, unlike China, it has not yet
spearheaded regional security and economic cooperation structures. Nor has it built for itself a comparable
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trade and energy investment profile in the region.
However, India has a tremendous long-term potential for enhancing its regional status as a major trade,
energy, and security player. This potential, similar to
the one already being displayed by China, depends
on India’s economic development and improvement
in the regional security situation involving unstable
Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Comparatively speaking, China’s share of labor in
the economic, political, and security areas is growing,
redefining the traditional division of labor among external powers in Central Asia. If left unchecked, China
could soon start assuming attributes of an emerging
hegemon. This prompts an assessment, if not the
forecast, of China’s potential role as a hegemon in
the region.
Attributes of China’s Regional Hegemony.
We know we have to play the game your way now,
but in 10 years, we will set the rules!
Chinese Diplomat, during China’s
negotiations to join the WTO
[World Trade Organization].115

Goldman Sachs predicts that China will be the
largest economy by 2050, closely followed by the
United States and India, while Russian, Mexican, and
Indonesian economies will be larger than the German,
French, and UK economies—a markedly reshaped
global economic order.116 No one knows how China’s
rise to the status of the world’s largest economy and
its approach to global affairs will define the security
and economic order of the world and Central Asia.
As a Chinese scholar observed, at this stage “China is
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not prepared for world leadership.”117 It still views the
outside world as a source of financial gains, making
it unprepared for a global leadership role.118 Not yet
clear about the need or desire to participate in global
governance, China tends to display a “transactional”
approach in its foreign relations, seeking to assess
any move with a cost-benefit analysis more suitable
to trading and narrow gain than to win-win approaches and outcomes.119 Deng Xiaoping even questioned the need for China to be a superpower. As he
famously said:
China is not a superpower, nor will it ever seek to be
one. If one day China should change its color and turn
into a superpower, if it too should play the tyrant in
the world, and everywhere subject others to its bullying, aggression, and exploitation, the people of the
world should . . . expose it, oppose it and work together with the Chinese people to overthrow it.120

The year Xiaoping gave the speech, China was only
starting its journey as an aspiring global power, and
the statement reflected China’s frustration with the
external environment and its inability to change much
about it. Today, however, China is a transformed nation, poised to also transform the world. The question
of its ambitions or potential to become a superpower
and project hegemony is as relevant as never before.
As Samuel Huntington observed:
China’s history, culture, size, economic dynamism,
and self-image all impel it to assume a hegemonic position in East Asia. This goal is a natural result of its
rapid economic development. Every other major power, Britain and France, Germany and Japan, the United
States and the Soviet Union, has engaged in outward
expansion, assertion, and imperialism coincidental
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with or immediately following the years in which it
went through rapid industrialization and economic
growth. No reason exists to think that the acquisition
of economic and military power will not have comparable effects on China.121

An assertion by Beijing that “China’s peaceful
development has broken away from the traditional
pattern where a rising power was bound to seek hegemony”122 is therefore yet to be tested, even if one
accepts a premise that a continued economic development is China’s way of fulfilling its international
responsibility.123 A lot will depend on how the United
States and its allies, among others, approach the issue
of integrating China and helping it assume a peaceful
and responsible role as a rising power. As Wang Jisi
points out, “China can rightfully be expected to take
on more international responsibilities. But then the
international community should take on the responsibility of helping the world’s largest member support
itself.”124
In the mid-term, China will continue adhering to
the rules of the international system while seeking
the creation of parallel rules and structures,125 undermining the U.S.-led system of global relations. After
the 2008 financial crisis, for instance, China lectured
Washington on malpractices that caused the downturn and emphasized government oversight in what
some view is its effort to “reinvent capitalism rather
than ruin it.”126 Just as other powers before it, Beijing
will seek to offer its own narratives and concepts of relations among states, including principles such “unity,” civilization-state,” “tributary system,’ its unique
view on race, and “centralization/decentralization.”127
These concepts will be pronounced in China’s inter-
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actions with neighboring states, including in Central
Asia, where attributes of its potential hegemony can
be classified into security, political, economic, and
cultural aspects of its predominance.
The security aspects of such predominance in Central Asia are likely to hinge on China’s strong institutional basis that would downsize Russia’s security
influence in the region. In this context, the SCO could
well be a precursor to a substantially revamped SCO
or another institution that afforded Beijing a role of
the leader rather than a co-manager of regional security orders. If it fails to project its dominant security
position via a regional security body due to strong
resistance of external and regional actors, it would—
at a minimum—seek to build strong security and
military ties with individual Central Asian republics.
Once Beijing asserts itself as the largest economy, it
will be more confident projecting its military role and
presence worldwide, especially in its “periphery.” If
Russia, the United States, and India have established
or plan to set up military bases in Central Asia, why
should it not be China’s mission, place, and time to do
so? Ultimately, China will have to reevaluate the principle of noninterference when it confronts the need to
deploy/use military force to protect its significantly
expanded overseas interests.128
This poses a question of whether China will seek
territorial expansion at the expense of Central Asia as
part of its potential efforts to establish a military hegemony. In the contemporary context, and in the next
15 years, the answer is likely to be a resounding “no.”
First, China and the regional republics delimited their
disputed borders, leaving no room for claims that
could spark the territorial expansion. Second, China’s
hegemony is likely to be economic in nature, in a way
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similar to the trade and finance-rooted imperial impulses historians have attributed to the United States
after it emerged as the world’s economic leader. Third,
the balance of power politics and involvement of other
actors would work against such a possibility. Fourth,
despite its territorial expansion throughout centuries,
China has not followed (yet) Western nations’ practices of overseas expansion or colonization of large territories beyond adjoining areas.129 Fifth, the changing
nature of power and the existence of nuclear weapons
in the hands of several major actors would constrain
an expansive military strategy by China. One already
sees “diminishing returns” to conquest and territorial expansion; destructiveness of modern combat; the
increased importance of legitimacy and other sources
of power (such as cultural and economic); economic
interdependence, etc., as factors changing the nature
of power in the 21st century.130
Finally, the historical context and the issue of China’s strategic military culture are important. Originally and extensively based on farming and agriculture,
Chinese civilization traditionally focused less on the
use of military force in order to set an example and
attract neighbors.131 Today, China is primarily leveraging its economic means and diplomacy in Central
Asia. As Parag Khanna observed:
China is winning the new Great Game because it is
building the new Silk Road, taking the best of the British and Russian strategies from a century ago: preserving buffer states and allies like the former but without
the abrasive conquest style of the latter.132

This is not to say that China’s territorial expansion
into Central Asia is impossible, not given the events in
Ukraine and Georgia, China’s history of expansions,
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border wars, and potentially critical regional developments. For over 2,000 years following the victory of
Qin dynasty during the Warring States period, China
expanded into south, north, and west to Central Asia,
relying on conquest, wars, bribery, assimilation, and
settlements. These experiences instilled a perception among Chinese that territorial expansion equals
“unification,” not “conquest.” China has pacified and
sought control of its periphery to secure its heartland,
protect overland trade routes, and strengthen the
hierarchical, sino-centric, Confucian regional order.
The Confucian institutions and ideas underscored
the internal order and stability over the conquest and
expansion. Only once they ensured internal stability
and order would most Chinese regimes start asserting
claims over the periphery or “consolidating the territorial boundaries of the Chinese state at their maximum
historical limits.”133 China’s expansion westward rested on a particular brutality and extended into Central
Asian zones in Xingjian, prompting a conclusion that,
“territorially speaking, China remains an empire.”134
Some Chinese scholars still consider the Ferghana
Valley as Chinese territory, with a PLA publication in
the early-1990s listing the eastern part of Kazakhstan
as constituting China’s historical boundaries.135
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Figure 2. China’s Wars against Periphery.136
Some further argue that the use of force is “endemic” in Chinese history. A Chinese military source
indicates that China was involved in a total of 3,790
internal and external wars between 1100 BC and AD
1910.137 During the first 3 decades since its founding, China fought more border wars than any other
state, which convinced authorities to launch a “good
neighbor diplomacy” with periphery states to ensure
a smoother rise to the ranks of most powerful.138 One
should recognize, however, that China has been, in
one shape or another, a civilization that has existed for
at least 3,000 years, a period long enough to witness
numerous wars.
In critical circumstances, one could imagine a
militarily powerful China conquering parts of Central
Asia to address state failure, uproot militants, protect its citizens, safeguard energy corridors, or repel
aggression of local, proxy, or extraregional forces.
In 2009, a senior Chinese military leader declared a
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possibility of military intervention in Central Asia in
case of destabilization caused by Islamists in the region.139 Meanwhile, the PLA plans “to forge a strong
military force” for “important missions,” including
those centered on the need to secure energy resources
in Central Asia.140 It has been “significantly advancing
its near-periphery power projection capability” and
could use its military capabilities in Xingjian for contingency operations in Central Asia.141 Its helicopters
are capable of electronic warfare operations, raids,
precision strikes, and air assaults.142 At this time, however, China is unable to effectively deploy its forces
for sustained periods or lead military missions on par
with the United States or Russia.
The political attributes of China’s potential hegemony present an equally complex case. On the one
hand, we could expect China’s rise to entrench authoritarianism and corruption, which observers associate with Beijing’s foreign relations and the regional
countries’ own practices. Already, China’s economic
engagement is constraining the region’s “sustainable
socio-economic development” by neglecting domestic
reforms.143 Meanwhile, its reliance on “secret and illicit techniques” to expand influence along its “continental periphery” damage democratization prospects
in Central Asia.144 On the other hand, China’s global
economic expansion is likely to translate into political
transformation of China and Central Asian countries,
with potentially positive effects on the global wave
of democratization. In China, many, including in the
leadership, are publicly discussing the merits of political reforms and democratization of the governance
system, albeit within limits that would ensure the
survival of the communist party’s position and development of the country according to Chinese distinct
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way.145 Central Asia can thus remain authoritarian
or become more democratic. The truth would likely
lie somewhere in between, especially given unique
aspects of global or regional hegemonies exercised
throughout history and the Central Asian states’ own
way of democratization and political development.
Becoming a democracy is no guarantee for stability. Democracies may not tend to fight one another,
but they do fight non-democracies. Studies also show
that “states that make the biggest leap in democratization” are “about twice as likely to fight wars in the
decade after democratization” than autocracies.146
According to Chinese political scientist Fei-Ling:
A ‘democratic’ regime in Beijing, free from the debilitating concerns for its own survival but likely driven
by popular emotions, could make the rising Chinese
power a much more assertive, impatient, belligerent,
even aggressive force, at least during the unstable period of fast ascendance to the ranks of a world-class
power.147

The rise of Chinese nationalism as part of China’s
democratization and the rise of Central Asian nationalisms (including as a response to China’s growing
presence) could present major security risks. An attack on Chinese interests in Central Asia may well invite a military response by Beijing fueled by popular
demand at home.
In addition to democratization and nationalism,
we should also consider China’s tribute system as a
major political, economic, and cultural aspect of its
conception of domestic and international orders. The
tributary system was largely a “cultural and moral
rather than administrative or economic system,” with
non-Chinese rulers adhering to appropriate norms
64

and ceremonies when being received by the emperor,
even if the reasons for contact could be economic. According to the system, a proper tribute to the emperor
suggests an acceptance of superiority of China’s civilization and, if accepted, would ensure noninterference
in the domestic affairs by China.148 It historically emphasized China’s superior role, relegating to “barbarians” the role of inferior beings incapable of matching the sophistication of China’s political and cultural
system.149
The Chinese regarded highly the principles of
social order and equality promulgated by Confucius
and other scholars and statesmen throughout history.
But this they did within the Chinese society, while applying a stratified approach to classifying and treating
foreigners. This is where cultural attributes of China’s
hegemony become especially relevant in Central
Asia—the region where China had actively interacted
with both the native and other civilizations in the past.
Will China’s political and social principles emerge as
the dominant shapers of social norms and interaction
in Central Asia? What impact will they have on the
region’s cultural and political systems? After all, China is first likely to project its hegemony in economic,
cultural, and racial terms, the latter being rooted in its
rich history as a civilization and long-standing tradition of classifying peoples according to a hierarchy.150
Or, will the regional peoples absorb the blow of “superior” Chinese values, as they have repeatedly done
vis-à-vis foreign cultures in the past?
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Figure 3. The Ancient Chinese View of the World.151
While Central Asians have shown a remarkable
ability to absorb foreign influences in the course of
wars, victories, defeats, and colonization throughout
history, a cultural interaction with the world’s largest
economy is almost certain to translate into a Chinese
cultural expansion shaping anything from cloth and
eating habits to literature and socio-political organization of life. Already, more students learn Chinese
and go to China than ever before. Chinese goods inundate regional markets. Chinese migrants, cars, and
restaurants increasingly appear in regional streets.
With China’s trade and investments come its growing
cultural and political influence. The reverse process
is true as well, but its magnitude is less profound or
even sustaining at this point.
China’s growing dominance in Xingjian is an important indicator of how Beijing is likely to treat Central Asia and its residents—an important question
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considering volatile socio-political dynamics in China
proper. Xingjian is changing rapidly, as Han Chinese
increasingly populate the area and authorities spend
billions to develop the region. The Confucion idea that
“humiliation stimulates effort” mobilized China’s attempts to address the wrongs of humiliation. But the
amassed wealth and power have reinforced the rise
of nationalism, inferiority complex, and poor treatment of its own citizens, especially in Xingjian, where
tensions between Han Chinese and Uyghurs are running high and accompanied by repeated violence and
clashes.152
While China’s power has grown, its “soft power”
in Central Asia and the world has remained limited.
The appeal of its culture or education in Central Asia
lags behind Russia, Turkey, and the West, albeit
growing rapidly.153 Aside from “peace and harmony,”
China has few universally appealing “soft power” attributes. As David Shambaugh argues, “the question
is not what is unique about China, but what is (potentially) universal about China. China’s universal “soft
power” aspects emphasize democracy between rather
than within states, appeal to the developing world,
China’s economic growth model, and its opposition
to global domination, especially following the global financial crisis caused by and blamed on the U.S.
economic model.154
But Beijing offers few alternatives or solutions. As
Chinese diplomat Wu Jianmin observed, China needs
to concentrate on “reinventing” Chinese culture as it
struggles with internal identity crisis and seeks to build
a “mainstream culture.” Chinese leadership plans to
invest a U.S.$7-10 billion annually into its “overseas
publicity work” to boost its cultural presence and
power.155 President Hu Jintao said this about China’s
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cultural presence and “soft power”: “We should bring
Chinese culture to the world, develop cultural soft
power compatible with China’s international standing, and increase the influence of Chinese culture in
the world.”156 China plans to set up 1,000 Confucius
Institutes worldwide by 2020 to help achieve this. In
the United States, these institutes came on the Federal
Bureau of Investigation radar because they may serve
as intelligence collection sites.157
Ultimately, it is China’s economic dominance that
will, first and foremost, define its hegemony in Central Asia. Beijing is already the region’s largest trading
and investment partner, increasingly making the tiny
regional economies revolve as satellites around the
“Middle Kingdom.” Moreover, its global economic
expansion resting on Central Asia is yet to result in
its overwhelmingly dominant position in the region,
despite Russia’s attempts to lock in the regional republics within the EU and keep China out. Beijing is
up to the challenge, proposing in early-2015 to create
a free trade zone with the union. As Beijing’s cultivates its economic partnerships with Central Asian
states, it is likely to significantly upgrade existing or
spearhead the creation of a new multilateral regional
body focused on trade and investment, with or without Russia’s participation. China’s growing economic
footprint would make other attributes of its projected
regional predominance more pronounced, consolidating them into a multifaceted regional hegemony. In
China’s eyes, a modernization rests on building “comprehensive power” as a distinguishing trait of previous empires, which had developed and prospered because they managed to attain power and influence in
numerous domains.158
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Before it comes to it, China has a long list of things
to accomplish. While it is a growing and influential
actor, at this stage it remains a “partial power,” projecting global influence only on trade, energy, commodities, real estate, luxury goods, and cyber hacking. First and foremost, China would need to address
economic, social, and environmental challenges that
impede its rise. It would also need to cultivate allies to
lead in the global order. As Professor Zhu Feng at Peking University noted, “China is a rising, but a lonely
power.”159 China may have a vision for the world, but
it is still figuring out its contours and how to achieve
it. The regional states and their partners therefore
still have the time to shape dynamics and outcomes
involving China’s rise.
Indigenous Responses to Regional Change.
The potential emergence and extent of China’s
multifaceted hegemony depends on the resistance
that the local countries and extraregional players put
up to meet the challenge. While regional agendas of
external players are a dominant component shaping
Central Asia’s evolution, it is the “game by the indigenous actors—even if often passive—that will be monumental in influencing the direction of Central Asia
and the extent of China’s regional influence. Overall,
the Central Asian republics are weak economically
and unstable politically due to their authoritarian systems of governance, which makes them less resourceful and less stable agents of geopolitical change. All of
them would like to be subjects rather than objects in
global affairs amidst geo-economic and geo-political
forces sweeping through Central Asia. But instead of
embracing openness and channeling it for long-term
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development and consolidation as full-fledged modern actors, the Central Asian regimes largely shun it
to preserve their hold on power.
Besides addressing domestic challenges as they relate to democratization of their political and economic
systems, the Central Asian states need to carefully
approach the issue of engaging external powers. On
the one hand, by overengaging them, the regional republics may undermine their independence. On the
other hand, by underengaging these actors as rising
and status quo powers, they may miss the momentum of development and continue to largely serve
external agendas. The best way for the Central Asian
states to benefit from the ongoing transformation of
the region’s geopolitics, to enhance their development
and sovereignty, and to prevent or mitigate a potential multifaceted hegemony in the region by China, is
to promote internal reforms, advance diversification
of external ties, and undertake multilateral intra- and
extraregional integration.
So far, Kazakhstan has been the most successful in
these areas. Its economy is larger than the four economies of the rest of the Central Asian states combined.
Economic liberalization has enabled it to attract more
than U.S.$180 billion in FDI since 1991. It has pursued
a more stable multivector foreign policy, has long held
a vision for Central Asia as an integrated region, and
could emerge as its political leader in the longer term.
Under the leadership of long-time President Nursultan Nazarbaev, Kazakhstan has actively proposed
and supported Central Asian integration, including
the original idea of an Eurasian union. However,
Astana’s efforts have largely failed due to the newlyfound independence of the republics, resentments,
and rivalries.
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Kazakhstan’s relationship with China is extensive,
but is also balanced by Astana’s relatively successfully
multivector foreign policy. China is Kazakhstan’s largest trade partner, with the parties planning to increase
bilateral trade to U.S.$40 billion. In January 2015, they
reached a preliminary deal to cooperate on projects
worth U.S.$50-60 billion and now consider doing
trade using national currencies.160 But as a neighbor,
Kazakhstan is uneasy about China’s growing demographic and investment profile in its energy sector as
well as China’s extensive use of water resources in
neighboring Xingjian for oil field development that
threaten the regional environment and strain Kazakhstan’s water resources.161 Kazakhstan’s leverage
vis-à-vis China comes down to its massive energy
resources, expanding transit potential, and strategic
partnerships with other powers, especially Russia. In
the years ahead, its biggest policy challenges are to ensure a peaceful and mutually beneficial co-existence
of Russia and China in Kazakhstan and Central Asia,
as well as promoting economic diversification and political liberalization at home. The issue of leadership
transition (Nazarbaev is going to be 75 in July 2015) is
going to be critical, given the need to either preserve
or improve the current course of the country’s grand
strategy.
Unlike Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan has not fully leveraged its geopolitical position as the center of the
region bordering all the Central Asian states plus Afghanistan. While its state-led economy grew rapidly
in recent years, it has been relatively isolated from
the regional markets, displayed major inefficiencies,
and shunned intraregional integration initiatives
proposed by actors inside and outside Central Asia.
The regime of the long-time President Islam Karimov
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knows that economic liberalization is key to addressing the country’s development challenges but, as with
other countries in the region, overlooks it to preserve
its hold on power. In foreign policy, Uzbekistan has
skillfully deflected pressure from Russia by suspending its CSTO membership, avoiding Moscow-led integration projects, briefly “flirting” with Washington,
and looking east to Beijing.
But Tashkent has also earned a reputation of an
unstable partner after evicting the U.S. base in 2005
and suspending CSTO membership. That said, China
is happy to accommodate the unruly Tashkent, as it
seeks to expand its regional stake. China now is Uzbekistan’s largest investor in the transit sector and the
second-largest trade partner.162 To balance China’s
growing presence in the national economy, Tashkent
has looked to Southeast Asian countries, specifically
Japan, South Korea, and Malaysia.163 Maintaining stability given the looming leadership transition (Karimov is 77 years old) and opening up its economy,
including for neighbors, are major imperatives for unleashing a more dynamic regional role for Uzbekistan,
especially given the growing strategic importance of
Central Asia as a primary transit zone across Eurasia.
A more dynamic, but regional, role by Tashkent would
better help it preserve its independent course, while
enabling Tashkent to unleash a more active economic
force in the broader region.
Uzbekistan’s neighbor, Turkmenistan has been
slowly opening up after the death of former President Saparmurat Niyazov in 2006. But it has a long
way to go before its reforms assume any signs of even
moderate economic and political liberalization. Under
the new President, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow, it
has markedly moved from a dormant foreign policy
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to actively “neutral” foreign policy. It still adheres to
“neutrality” in foreign affairs, avoiding post-Soviet
economic and collective security institutions in the
region at all cost. But it has effectively leveraged its
energy resources to advance ties with China, Iran,
the EU, and India, undermining Moscow’s grip on its
energy resources and, by implication, Kremlin’s influence on its foreign policy course.164 Until 2009 Russia
had been Turkmenistan’s major energy partner, but
today this role belongs to China—a development that
now increasingly prompts Ashgabat to look to India
and the EU to balance Beijing. China has also become
Turkmenistan’s largest trading partner. Ashgabat’s
dynamic role hinges on the pursuit of much-needed
economic and political reforms as well as diversification of its gas and cotton exports-dependent economy.
Kyrgyzstan is by far the least authoritarian state in
Central Asia and, in the long run, may emerge as the
first democratic state in the broader region after Mongolia. Two of its former strongmen, Askar Akayev and
Kurmanbek Bakiyev are no longer presidents, having
been forced to flee to Russia and Belarus following
anti-government protests in 2005 and 2010. Despite
the struggle of factions over power being a cause of
the protests, the cases show a wider room for popular participation and political mobilization, a scenario
deemed unthinkable in neighboring countries. Kyrgyzstan also has a relatively vibrant and open political and media environment. The incumbent President
Almazbek Atambayev succeeded the country’s firstever female president, Roza Otunbayeva in 2011. But
any democratization successes in the country have
been accompanied by poor economic performance and
instability. Kyrgyzstan is one of the poorest republics in the region, with no major resources. Suffering
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from uneven economic development, it has struggled
to preserve social stability, as the inter-ethnic clashes
revealed in 2010.
Bordering China, Kyrgyzstan is in a unique position to leverage the rise of China to advance its
economic development while seeking political and
security reassurances from Russia and the United
States. China has growing investments in Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan’s mining sectors, looks to import their
electricity to meet the growing demand in Xingjian,
expand the use of agricultural lands, and has either
started or considers building refineries in both countries, which should alleviate these countries’ dependence on fuel from Russia.165 Going forward, Bishkek
should lean on external parties to develop east-west
and north-south connections to ensure a more even
economic development. It should also seek to retain
its role as a re-export post for China but necessarily
start building a new role as an intraregional trade conduit for Central Asian states and India. It should thus
look beyond Russia and China when participating in
initiatives proposed by regional and external players.
All these measures should ensure it does not become
a tiny satellite orbiting the second largest planet in the
galaxy next door, also known as China.
Of all countries in Central Asia, Tajikistan faces
the most severe political, economic, and security challenges. It suffers from the legacy of the civil war in
the 1990s, with authorities unable to uproot Islamic
radicalization and consolidate control over parts of
the country dominated by Islamist militants and remnants of opposition. Led by Emomali Rahmon since
the collapse of the Soviet Union, Tajikistan is known
for a tightly controlled political system that has marginalized opposition groups and contributed to the
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Islamic radicalization and emergence of the only Islamic party in the region. Authorities have also failed
to resuscitate its relatively isolated economy overly
dependent on aluminum and cotton exports and ever-expanding drug flows from neighboring Afghanistan. The downstream Uzbekistan has occasionally
imposed transport blockades on Tajikistan, impeding
the import of construction materials intended for the
construction of water dams and thereby contributing
to the isolation of the country’s economy. Dushanbe
looks to China, Iran, and Afghanistan to break the
isolation, in part by expanding electricity exports and
seeking to position itself as a transit corridor along the
southern edge of Central Asia. As far as its security
ties, Dushanbe largely relies on Russia, which has a
base in Tajikistan, for security of its southern perimeter, military assistance, and security guarantees.
As a country bordering China and Afghanistan,
Tajikistan could benefit from policies of these actors
seeking to enhance interregional connectivity. It especially looks to China to develop its transit infrastructure—a major imperative considering the currently
low level of trade between China and Tajikistan and
the related potential for the two countries to bring
their economic relationship to new heights. As one
Tajik soldier remarked, “We border China and Afghanistan, not Russia anymore. Without these roads
the Chinese are building, we couldn’t even get around
our own country.”166 To better take advantage of external and domestic opportunities for the purposes
of coping with its economic and security challenges,
Tajikistan would need to improve public institutions,
curb narco-trafficking, reduce corruption, diversify
the economy, improve relations with Uzbekistan, and
pursue trade links with India, Pakistan, Afghanistan,
and Iran.
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Cooperation with China is key for more rapid development of all the regional countries, which looks
forward to maximizing related benefits by pursuing
infrastructure development and trade cooperation
with Beijing without compromising—to an extent
possible—their territorial integrity and independence.
But despite these benefits, all the Central Asian states
resent Han migration, inundation of cheap Chinese
products that drive out local businesses, and China’s
overall economic expansion.167 Of the Central Asian
states, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are especially vulnerable. Unlike Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, which either do not border China or have
pursued more independent foreign policies, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in the future might have to substitute Russia as their security and economic protector
from China.168
The Central Asian states may attain a number of
benefits from their existing or potential memberships
and participation in the EU or the “belt” initiative.
But these benefits would be larger and the negatives
would be fewer if they learned to turn to one another
rather than look beyond each other. Harnessing regional change is not easy for these small actors, not
when the big players are in large part driving the
change and impacting the evolution of the region.
Only by standing together—creating an intraregional
platform of genuine cooperation—will they achieve
more security and prosperity in the face of external
pressures exerted by established and aspiring powers.
The Central Asian states should leverage the regional
designs of these actors to build this platform, but they
should be cautious not to give up too much for too
little. Deepening cooperation with actors situated outside Central Asia, such as India and the United States,
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will remain critical for the regional capitals. Advancing ties with these relatively distant balancers will enable them to survive the global power shifts and the
age of the rising powers.
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CHAPTER III
ADVANCING U.S.
“PIVOT TO EURASIA”
If we shrink from the hard contests where men must
win at hazard of their lives and at the risk of all they
hold dear, then the bolder and stronger peoples will
pass us by and will win for themselves the domination
of the world.
				Theodore Roosevelt169

The United States need not, as some fear, leave
its fate to “chance and globalization.”170 China’s possible replacement of the United States as the strongest
power requires that Washington apply more effort to
steer the global system and its relations with key partners to ensure that: 1) this scenario does not happen;
or 2) it unfolds peacefully. The reliance on the military
will be important to the U.S. primacy, but the overall
appeal and effectiveness of the military in retaining
and promoting global influence has been declining.
As Geoff Dyer aptly stated:
The most influential state will be the one that is best at
setting agendas, mobilizing support, and which comes
across as the more reasonable. . . . A quest for continued military dominance will not do the trick: Washington needs to enlist new partners.171

The United States and its allies should therefore
initiate a “structural adjustment to globalization,”172
focusing on revitalization of their economies and
adjustment of the global economic and security architecture in concert. The domestic economies lack
competitiveness, while the post-World War II archi78

tecture requires the involvement of aspiring powers to
sustain itself and the position of the United States as
a leading actor of the international system: As Parag
Khanna observed:
without a new division of labor, Western institutions
will diminish with America’s power, leaving only
classic geopolitical competition without even the veneer of diplomatic coordination. If the superpowers
do not choose adaptation over fundamentalism, they
will miss a chance to keep history permanently in the
past.173

Because of Central Asia’s centrality to the U.S.
mission to shape the global order, the United States
should launch another pivot, this time to Eurasia, by
boosting its long-term military and economic engagement in the region and partnering with other actors in
ensuring a peaceful rise of China, and safe evolution
of the regional and global security and economic orders. Pursuing a regional policy that is not hostage to
reactions from Russia or China and increasing direct
cooperation with individual republics is the most effective way of shoring up U.S. regional influence and
sending a message to the regional states and external
parties about U.S. interest and commitment to the development and stability of the region in the coming
decades. This need is becoming greater by the year due
to rapid emergence of China as the leading economic
force in Central Asia and its projected ascendance as a
major regional military power, as well.
The conflicts in Ukraine and South China Sea have
accentuated the need for Washington to reinforce its
support for allies and partners in the post-Soviet space
and East Asia. They have also demonstrated a need
for its allies to assume a greater share of responsibility
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for collective defense by relieving the global U.S. military burden. This imperative is acute, given the rise
of potential military challengers, internal and external
opposition to overseas U.S. military presence, and
projected cuts in U.S. defense spending. Washington
should encourage its allies to contribute a larger share
of resources for their own defense, NATO, and protection of global commons. This would help the United
States save resources and focus on military deployment, either planned or in response to conflicts, in areas that are critical to its interests but that are lacking
adequate security infrastructure for such deployment,
as is the case in Central Asia.174 The military component of cooperation with allies should go in parallel
with joint economic efforts to promote development
and safe integration of Central Asia into the global
economy.
The U.S. role as a balancing force from a distance is
a welcome tool for the Central Asian states seeking to
strengthen their independence. But the Central Asian
republics, among others in the broader region, may
choose accommodation and bandwagoning to deal
with the rising China.175 This could be the case if these
actors had no committed partners to balance Beijing.
Hence, it is important that the U.S. regional influence
is palpable, direct, and extended, enabling it to build
solid and deep connections with individual Central
Asian states. In the succeeding pages are recommendations—presented as components of the proposed
U.S. “Pivot to Eurasia”—for the United States to steer
the geopolitics of Central Asia in order to ensure a
leading global position of Washington for decades to
come and evolution of stable global order amid the
rise of China.
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Boosting Military Engagement in the Region.
On the military front, Washington must ensure it
builds on the legacy of its military presence in the region and takes its withdrawal from Afghanistan as an
opportunity to devise a more Central Asia-specific military policy in Eurasia that would ensure a long-term
U.S. regional military presence. The United States is
unlikely to secure a heavy or permanent military presence in the region any time soon given the objections
of Russia, China, Iran, and some elites in Central Asian
countries. Any such presence could contribute to the
militarization of an arms race in the greater region
bordering four nuclear-armed powers (potentially
five if Iran “goes nuclear”). But the United States must
have a military role and presence sufficient to discourage attempts at military domination and protect the
region’s push for inclusion into the global economy,
while retaining flexibility to choose whether to intervene in any particular situation or conflict in the
region.
The military policy should focus on: 1) continuing
to support counterterrorism, anti-drug trafficking, and
special operations capabilities of the regional states as
ends in themselves and as a platform for more substantive military cooperation in the future; 2) arranging for temporary and permanent basing rights; 3)
advancing reforms of local armed forces and interoperability as part of NATO PfPs and bilateral ties; 4)
boosting military-to-military and civilian-to-civilian
contacts and cooperation in the area of defense and
emergency management through education programs
and military exercises; 5) capitalizing on the NDN
achievements to promote partnerships; 6) preventing further militarization and arms race, especially
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in the Caspian to the west and the Fergana Valley to
the south; 7) encouraging indigenous approaches to
managing collective security and related institution
building as pillars of regional and global stability; 8)
cultivating ally and partner military ties with all major players for confidence-building purposes and contingencies that may require a joint military action in
support of U.S. security interests.
Washington should use some of the resources
freed up after the disengagement from Afghanistan
toward building more sustained military-to-military
and civilian-to-civilian partnerships and institutions
with regional counterparts. This imperative is critical
because the U.S. withdrawal is expected to undercut
the already low-level of military and nonmilitary aid
to Central and South Asian states and undermine the
perceived importance of the broader region for U.S.
security interests, policymakers, strategic planners,
and even U.S. allies and partners. Washington should
see it through with its Central Asia Counternarcotics Initiative and create new or significantly enhance
its present military and security institutions with the
Central Asian states. Building a web of institutions
in military and security area is critical to ensure U.S.
long-term position in the region and its ability to
prevent or mitigate swings in foreign policy by the
regional capitals.
While it is inevitable that the United States would
deepen its military ties with select Central Asian countries, it should advance its partnerships with all the
regional states and in a way that builds multilateral,
intraregional initiatives, relationships, and dynamics.
This is critical as Washington seeks to promote winwin outcomes as part of the NSRS and prevent regional militarization. The U.S. military role should culti-
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vate a durable and long-term institutional security
infrastructure by fostering multilateral partnerships
with countries in and outside the region, encouraging
the regional states to pursue collective solutions to the
management of common security challenges. External
rivalries and intraregional conflicts without a durable
institutional framework in place (not imposed, but
inclusive and collective) is a recipe for disaster of continental proportions, which the U.S. military policy
should seek to avoid.
Upgrading U.S. New Silk Road Initiative.
The lack of commitment to the NSRS by Washington reveals a low priority the United States assigns to
the region, regardless of theoretical arguments that
otherwise require a deeper and more substantive U.S.
engagement in Central Asia. While sustaining a military role in the region is important to ensure a more
seamless integration of Central and South Asia into
the global economy, having no substantial economic
stake in the region puts the United States at a disadvantage in its nascent but increasingly important strategic relationships with Central Asian states.
The United States needs to support the engagement
of American and Western businesses; enhance investments; encourage diversification of energy, trade,
and transit links; and advance reforms to boost the
region’s economic development potential. Providing
economic aid will remain crucial, but helping advance
institutional capacity and private sector engagement
should form a durable, long-term, and self-sustaining
approach to regional development. If it decides to
treat the NSRS as its long-term economic strategy, it
should focus on the following points.
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First, Washington needs to pursue a more concerted effort to realize the vision of the NSRS, which
requires more financial resources, commitment, leadership, and coordination. Instead of just “cobbling
together existing programs”—as was reportedly the
case—and allocating real funding for the initiative—
which reportedly was not done—the United States
should come up with financial resources to implement
existing and new projects.176 Actors view the NSRS as
a substitute for the military disengagement from Afghanistan, but do not find it resourceful, especially as
the military pullout threatens to undermine the NDNgenerated business activity.
Second, Washington should develop a “software”
component of the NSRS with a view to improve the
business climate and expand international economic
flows of the regional countries. This entails reducing tariff and nontariff trade barriers as part of Trade
and Investment Framework Agreements framework,
which should be closely integrated with the NSRS, and
working with development and financial institutions,
nongovernmental organizations and the WTO. Improving governance and transparency would be key
to reduce corruption and promote efficient economies
and accountable governments in the region. As part
of the “hardware” component of the NSRS, Washington should provide more direct support to TAPI and
CASA-1000, as well as allocate funding for specific energy, trade, and transit regional and interregional infrastructure projects. The U.S. direct engagement will
be a signal for other actors who may be interested in
such projects but have security concerns to participate
in them.
Finally, just as it promotes free trade and other economics agreements and partnerships with Asian and
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European nations, Washington should spearhead such
arrangements in and with Central and South Asian
states as a way to lock in its long-term economic presence. The institutionalization of its economic presence
would project an image of the United States as a more
committed and reliable partner. It would also provide
additional incentives to nurture direct U.S. economic
engagement with the Central Asian economies for
the longer haul, while providing options for the regional states to lessen their economic dependence on
China and Russia. The current NSRS does not achieve
this for the aforementioned reasons. It also does not
have a strong institutional underpinning as far as
the responses and participation of individual Central
Asian countries or the region as a collective body are
concerned. Addressing these deficiencies would substantially enhance the U.S. economic presence in the
region, either as part of a revitalized NSRS or a new
initiative, but necessarily in the framework of the U.S.
“Pivot to Eurasia.”
Advancing Cooperation with Key Partners.
On the western flank of Central Asia, Washington
should encourage the EU to play a more assertive role
in the security sphere, including through NATO PfP
programs and bilateral relations of its members. A
possible full military withdrawal by the United States
from Afghanistan and the region only accentuates
this objective. Engaging the EU and its member-states
would help the United States deflect otherwise more
vocal opposition from China and Russia to increased
military collaboration between NATO states and Central Asian countries. It would also help Washington
reduce costs associated with its global military burden
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and contribute to any security arrangements that will
be in place in the region after the withdrawal from
Afghanistan. From border management to conflict
prevention, the EU’s regional engagement is critical
for Washington. The U.S diplomacy should do a better
job persuading the EU to assume an expanded regional security role. The Russian-Georgian War and the
war in Ukraine, which occurred on the EU’s doorstep,
and the possibility of an interstate conflict in Central
Asia, provide sufficient grounds for developing and
pursuing a more active security role by the EU.
Both Washington and Brussels should also significantly increase their economic presence in the region.
Besides being one of the region’s largest trade partners, the EU is a source of substantial development
assistance in a wide range of areas important for
economic and political development of the regional
republics. While the development of Central Asia’s
energy resources to enhance the European energy
security should remain a paramount objective of the
U.S.-EU regional engagement, Washington and Brussels should take long-term policy precautions in light
of the growing regional energy profiles of China and
India, which are already diverting energy resources
in substantially larger volumes than anticipated and
in a way that may fully sideline Russia and the EU
as the region’s main energy partners. Replacing one
dominant energy actor in the region with another is
not a solution; developing a multivector orientation
of the regional capitals is. This is a key to the future
of Central Asia as an integrated region of free states.
Washington and Brussels should be more creative in
advancing regional integration and developing the
westward vector of the region’s energy, trade, and
transit development.
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Both the United States and the EU need to be more
patient and flexible with conditions for political and
economic liberalization when engaging the regional
counterparts. The regional presence and heavy security and state-led economic roles of authoritarian Russia and China require a more integrated approach to
regional democratization. Washington and Brussels
should join forces and emphasize China’s and Russia’s opaque approaches to economic cooperation,
while promoting fair standards of conducting business relations.177 A more integrated democratization
agenda would enhance U.S. efforts aimed at advancing transparent governments and open societies in
Central Asian countries, which require profound economic and political reforms to become full-fledged
and peaceful multi-ethnic states. Finally, both should
consider using the EU experience with regional integration and governance, which in some respects could
serve a model for the region178when promoting intraregional institutional development.
On the northern flank, Washington has no other
way but to engage Russia given China’s regional designs and the possibility of confrontation emerging
between Moscow and Beijing over influence in Central Asia decades ahead. While it should not overlook
Russia’s imperial advances in the region, it should
pursue a more nuanced and delicate approach to
Moscow’s initiatives and agenda that may serve U.S.
interests of preventing a global domination by Beijing
and providing more breathing space for Central Asian
republics. Some portray Russia as the “ultimate swing
state” in the future struggle over primacy in Eurasia,
making bets on whether NATO, CSTO, or the SCO
will have an upper hand in Central Asia. It is not inconceivable that the time will come when the United
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States will have to repeat the historic moment of opening up China with Russia in order to save Moscow and
itself from Beijing’s global domination.179 Of course,
the United States should have no illusions about Russia’s own goals. However, if the current development
trajectories of great and aspiring powers hold, Russia may be lucky to have Washington as a partner
in shaping the evolution of what may well become a
post-Russian space.
In the meantime, cooperating with Russia as the
major regional security actor is important for the
United States in order to ensure regional stability,
and the United States should continue advancing cooperation in counterterrorism, anti-drug trafficking,
and counterproliferation, while starting to promote
confidence-building measures as part of a broader
regional security agenda due to the rise of China. Advancing cooperation on these issues—necessarily in
the context of implications brought about by the rise
of China in Central Asia—will gradually help build
mutual confidence and allow Washington to pursue
policies toward Central Asia that are not hostage to
Russia’s objections or interference. On the economic
front, Washington should seek to shape Russia’s participation in regional projects promoting north-south
or south-north connectivity, provided such participation involves multilateral cooperation and is as less
politicized, imposing, and one-dimensional as possible. In the current climate of strained ties, doing so
may be more difficult than anticipated despite longterm trends suggesting more room for a more constructive partnership between the United States and
Russia. Moscow views Washington as a spoiler after
a decade of war in Afghanistan that has left behind
instability and security risks in the form of expand-
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ed drug trafficking, refugee flows, and cross-border
militancy. Russia also objects to the U.S. Central Asia
Counternarcotics Initiative, viewing it as a tool to augment U.S. regional military presence in Central Asia
and gather military intelligence on CSTO members.180
On the southern flank, the United States should develop a long-term partnership with India, especially as
it concerns Central Asia’s evolution. For both Washington and Delhi, reconnecting Central and South Asia
is imperative because it would boost India’s energy
deficit-stricken economy, ensure the development of
Afghanistan, strengthen India’s position relative to
China, and promote India’s expanding trade via Central Asia to European and Middle Eastern markets.
India’s rise is set to expand Central Asia’s southward
vectors of connectivity. With time, the Central Asian
states will seek to deflect the pressure from the east
(China) by cultivating closer ties with India, as they
pursue an efficient and secure way of connecting with
the world. But Delhi is a relative latecomer to the renewed version of the “Great Game” unfolding in Central Asia, making it imperative for the United States to
develop and pursue with India a more robust, direct,
integrated, and long-term strategy of engagement focused on the region. The U.S. role will be critical for
expanding Delhi’s regional presence given similarity
of regional goals expressed in the Indian “connect”
policy and the U.S. NSRS, as we all have their shared
apprehension about Russia’s and China’s dominant
military and economic positions.
India is further an important military and economic partner for Washington in rebuilding Afghanistan and could become a major partner in managing
China’s rise on both the land and the high seas. It can
be a greater source of counterterrorism capabilities for
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Central and South Asian states. Its democratic political
tradition and economic success as a developing nation
is an asset, which both Delhi and Washington should
utilize to improve regional political and economic
systems. While emerging slowly, India’s regional economic presence is set to grow considerably over the
next decades if India’s upward growth dynamics do
not falter. India’s involvement in the region would be
pronounced in the energy sphere if TAPI, CASA-1000,
and other interregional projects materialized and expanded. The substantial presence of Russia and China
in Central Asia, the uncertainty surrounding the war
in Afghanistan, and the region’s potential to serve as
a transcontinental trade, energy, and transit hub point
to the benefits of the United States and India working
together to advance development and stability in the
broader region.
On the eastern flank of Central Asia, the U.S. engagement with China will be critical for the future of
Central Asia and the long-term positions of both powers. This engagement—already the most critical of all
bilateral relationships—is set to grow in importance
as China’s interests spread globally and interact with
the interests of the still strongest power. The United
States should start pursuing a memorandum of understanding with China on Beijing’s growing presence
in Central Asia. This memorandum should serve as a
component of its overarching memorandum regarding China’s global rise and must not compromise the
sovereignty of the Central Asian states. In the process,
the United States should be guided by the need to
manage China’s rise on two major flanks: the east and
the west. While it launched the “pivot” to the Pacific
to do the job in the east, it failed to initiate a credible
“pivot” to Central Asia to do so in the west. Instead,
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it is pursuing a “U-turn” given its plans to withdraw
from Afghanistan.
If Washington views the NSRS as part of the proposed “pivot” to the region, it should ensure that the
initiative rests on a solid commitment, sufficient resources, and worked-out mechanisms of interaction
with China’s “belt” initiative. Otherwise, the NSRS
may become a smart concept that China is implementing in practice. As it considers a credible “pivot” to
Central Asia, Washington should assess the merits
of promoting a consortium of connectivity initiatives promoted by all external players and necessarily supported by the Central Asian states. It should
thus closely watch China’s proposal for a free trade
zone with the EU because China is seeking an intraregional trade zone based on local currency convertibility, which would accelerate the internationalization
of Chinese currency and conflict with the U.S. trade
policy based on convertibility of local currencies to
an international standard, such as the U.S. dollar.181 In
the security field, the United States should seek ways
of cooperating with the SCO to advance regional stability182 and prepare the ground for likely regional
military expansion by China.
Cooperating with China is absolutely critical for
the global stability and the future of the broader region, given Beijing’s rapidly growing economic presence; expanding global trade profile; and the need
for the United States to encourage China-led energy,
trade, and transit connections in all directions to shrink
Central Asia’s connectivity gap and enhance regional
development. China’s economic role is also important
for the evolution of Afghanistan and Pakistan. China’s
growing investment in the countries is important for
the long-term stability, development, and integration
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within and between Central and South Asia. As part
of its engagement with China, Washington should
encourage Beijing’s push for advancing Central and
South Asia’s connectivity with the global economy.
But just as in the case with Russia, the United States
should discourage any of Beijing’s attempts at economic and military domination in the region and promote, to the extent possible, the economic and security engagement of Central Asian actors with actors
as diverse as India, Turkey, and, with time, even Iran.
This would provide Central Asian states with more
options for advancing development and stability and
for maneuvering on the global stage.
Shaping China’s Global Ascendance.
Washington should approach the objective of shaping China’s rise with a particular attention. China’s
experiment, if unsuccessful, would have disastrous
consequences for the entire world, including the United States itself. Unlike the Soviet Union then, China
today is integrated with the global system, and its
success is closely linked with the success of the global
economy and projected global economic convergence.
Implosion of China could well usher in the age of disunity and encroachments on China’s sovereignty183
and increased risk of collisions among great powers
that could cause collateral and permanent damage
for small states—a scenario all too familiar to history.
The mission of the U.S. statecraft vis-à-vis China is as
simple as it is complex; supporting conditions for a
peaceful rise of China that would not threaten U.S.
fundamental interests of leading the global order and
protecting the global commons.
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A subtext of this mission is the need for the United
States to ensure a smooth power transition from the
“West to the Rest.” Ideally, this power shift would
see China emerge as a democratic and prosperous
nation working in partnership with the United States
and its partners in leading the global security and
economic order. Washington should start pondering
formulas enabling China and India to participate in
the management of global order today.184 The earlier it
starts, the better. If China succeeded in becoming the
strongest power without Washington shaping China’s
rise in process, the consequences for the U.S. global
standing would be disastrous.
While both the United States and China are integrated economically, they have different goals, interests, and views on global affairs. What they need is a
solid platform of bilateral engagement to help cultivate “strategic trust,” common objectives, and shared
interests.185 Such a platform would need to ensure that
the parties eventually reach the stage of comfortably
discussing and addressing respective concerns about
interference in internal affairs and lack of democratization. The United States should seek to institutionalize its relationship with China early on as part of an
overarching memorandum with Beijing, perhaps by
giving a chance to the proposed G-2 model or working on global warming challenges before plunging to
other, more sensitive areas.186
This is critical because Chinese leaders are often silent on the question of what China wants, what strategies it seeks, what alternatives it offers, and what it
envisions its global and regional role and presence to
be.187 On this issue, the United States should encourage a transparent dialogue with China, making Beijing
more vocal and clear about its priorities. This would
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allow Washington to hold Beijing accountable to a
proclaimed policy direction and help Beijing cultivate
for itself a responsible role in world affairs seeking
win-win outcomes. Pursuing the institutionalization
of this relationship by spearheading multilateral structures involving both parties could serve as a precursor
to the emergence of such a platform in the future.
As it pursues this goal, the United States should
pay attention to the “normative dimension of China’s
integration” into the global economic and security
system, an integration that remains “limited” despite
Beijing’s growing global footprint. This means more
training, education, and capacity-building programs
aimed at developing common understanding of the
rules of the game.188 These rules inevitably concern
the domestic political situation in both countries, and
the United States should continue efforts aimed at advancing democratization of China. As 2010 Chinese
Nobel Peace Prize winner Liu Xiabao stated on the
issue of governance in China: “. . . We would rather
have two mutually balancing devils than one angel
with absolute power.”189 A change in the political system, decades after successful changes to the country’s
economic system, would assure the rest of the world
about China’s peaceful emergence as a great power.
As Henry Kissinger observed, “. . . peace with China
is less a matter of strategy than of change in Chinese
governance.”190 The United States should closely work
with a fifth generation of Chinese leaders since the
creation of the People’s Republic of China, who were
not exposed to Mao’s Cultural Revolution and are enjoying the benefits of a rapidly-modernizing China.191
But Washington should be under no illusion that a
democratized China may emerge as a much more formidable power in economic and military terms than
an authoritarian China could ever be.192
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Finally, Washington should engage as many partners as possible in shaping China’s rise. The key relationships in this regard are with India in South Asia,
Russia in Central Asia, Japan in East Asia, and the EU
in the Caspian. In case of improved ties with Iran in
the years or decades ahead, Washington should find
in Tehran an important pillar of its regional policy
vis-à-vis China. The idea behind such multilateral cooperation on the issue of China’s rise is not to punish, isolate, or contain Beijing. Rather, the goal is to
engage China on multiple fronts to make its stake in
this ever-expanding web of relationships more obvious, precious, and self-sustaining. This would demonstrate the importance of China to the global stability and the importance of global stability to China’s
evolution as a great power. If Beijing indeed seeks a
peaceful development and is adamant about its ability to rewrite history by ensuring a peaceful power
transition, it should be willing to pursue some form
of accommodation vis-à-vis the “ruler” and the “rules
of the game.” Whether China does emerge as a global
power in all dimensions, of course, remains to be seen.
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CONCLUSION
If China Succeeds or Fails: The Future of
Economic and Security Order in Central Asia.
China’s rise has prompted some to quip that “BC”
and “AC” should now represent the period of history
before China and the period of history after China,
and that the year 1978 when China undertook reform
should mark “the great watershed” separating the two
eras.193 China already once was the largest economy
in the 19th century. Attaining this position again in
the 21st century should not be new to Beijing. Chinese
leadership views the country’s rise as enabling Beijing
to reclaim its status of a great and central power. Productive capacity of any aspiring great power is instrumental for becoming a great power in all dimensions
and projecting a global hegemony, with the United
States representing the latest, although probably not
the last, example of a great power harnessing its economic capacity for purposes of alleged global expansion. If there is another state close to repeating this experience any time soon, it is China.194 In a reversal of
its centuries-long tradition, China today significantly
relies on the external system of economic relations to
facilitate its internal development and is profoundly
integrated with the global economic system. Rather
than viewing the system as a threat, China has embraced it, catapulting itself into the ranks of fastestgrowing economies and being poised to overtake the
U.S. economy in terms of total GDP in the next few
years and in terms of GDP per capita by about 2050.
China’s ongoing emergence as a global power has
questioned the position of the United States as the
strongest power and the future of the Washington-led
global security and economic order. But achieving the
96

status of a truly global actor welding influence in all
dimensions of power would require China, among
other things, to leverage its regional influence in Central Asia—a region representing its western leg of
economic expansion and development, which is assuming a growing strategic importance for Beijing. It
is also a region that should be of greater importance to
Washington seeking to preserve its leading position
in the international system and ensure China’s peaceful integration in the global political, security, and
economic architecture.
Viewed in this light, the question of future economic and security order in Central Asia is of paramount importance to global stability. The region is
experiencing constantly shifting “push-pull” forces
exerted by external powers, which advance agendas
often conflicting with those of other powers or the
views of the Central Asian states, increasing the risk of
regional or global conflicts. Russia “pulls” the region
north; the EU, west; the United States, west and south;
India, south; and China, east. While none of them yet
wield an overwhelming influence across all categories of power, it is China that is already projecting the
strongest economic presence and has the potential to
build “comprehensive influence” (economic, cultural,
political, and military).
We cannot know what China’s hegemony will look
like. China is silent on its vision for the world or the
region, let alone its potential hegemony that it claims
it does not seek. In the early-1990s, Chinese leadership
warned against assuming leadership in global affairs
and show restraint for fear of threatening other actors
and its own development. But Beijing has gradually
been shedding off this guideline as its economic profile has been consistently on the rise.195 If it came to
pass, China’s regional hegemony would probably rest
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on an overwhelmingly strong economic, demographic, and cultural presence. The philosophical underpinnings of China’s hegemony would draw on the mix of
China’s modernity with contemporary and universal
characteristics and its rich Confucius tradition and the
tributary system that emphasizes Chinese superiority over the “barbarians.” The net effect would be a
more enhanced economic development of the regional states, which are connected to the global system
through China as its most dynamic center of economic
activity, but are also subordinate to China’s economic
and cultural paradigm. The regional states would lose
their political and economic independence, while preserving their territory and struggling to retain their
rapidly changing cultural make-up.
While China is also likely to expand its military
influence in the region, including by establishing military bases, depots, and logistics centers, it is unlikely
to project its hegemony through territorial expansion
or acquisition by force. The presence of other actors,
the existence of nuclear weapons in the hands of its
strategic rivals, and the changing nature of power in
the 21st century conditions would work against this
scenario or, at a minimum, constrain China’s use of
the military in the region as an occupying force. These
factors, however, leave the possibility of China using
force to seize parts of Central Asia to repel aggression against its own territory, protect its threatened
economic assets, and pursue militants in case of state
failure in the region.
Other scenarios are also possible. If it attained the
status of the world’s strongest economic and military
power, China could display an even more assertive
stance in foreign affairs. It has already started doing
that in Asia vis-à-vis Vietnam, Japan, and the Phil-

98

ippines, drawing on both the reality and perception
of its growing national strength. A collision with the
United States, for example, could spark proxy wars,
with Washington and Beijing supporting respective
parties196—a situation that would almost surely involve Central Asia. As Russia before it, China may
well seek to cave out for itself a zone of special influence in Central Asia. Or, as it had itself done earlier,
China could simply devour the tiny republics through
enhanced Han migration, economic flows, and military expansion, essentially subjugating the region. On
the other hand, the region’s economic and security
order under a China’s hegemony need not be bloody
or rest on China’s military subjugation or domination.
China already surprised the world with its impressive,
decades-long economic growth, and may do so again
if its follows through on its declaration to ensure a
peaceful transition of power by way of its peaceful development. Viewed through this prism, China’s global
and regional hegemony may turn out to be benevolent and conducive to continued global and regional
economic development and stability, with especially
strong benefits for China’s neighbors in Central Asia
that need to catch up fast with the world.
But China’s hegemony may never pass. China
faces numerous socio-economic, environmental, and
political challenges that could derail or delay its rise to
the ranks of global or regional hegemons. The wealth
China has amassed has made the internal social dislocations and inequality more pronounced, exposing its
economic model and making it vulnerable to external
influences. This has prompted some in the leadership
to be concerned about China’s external engagement
and steer it into the direction of an inward-looking
country with a strong coercive state apparatus and
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“accelerated efforts to develop the capabilities” needed to “control the periphery.”197 More generally, China’s economy is in the process of readjustment, which
is slowing down its growth rate from double digits in
the previous decades to single digits today and years
ahead. As a popular observation goes, China will
“also get old first before it gets rich.” Some therefore
argue that China is a “partial” global power that is
pursuing an “Empty Fortress” stratagem in Central
and South Asia. Specifically, the argument goes, it has
been seeking to position itself as a strong and rising
power when, in reality, it is facing major challenges
constraining its global rise.198
Unless it implements profound economic and political reforms, and lessens its vulnerability to “exogenous developments” (e.g., excessive dependence on
trade), China may not make it as the global hegemon
or a “comprehensively” great power. To translate
its “economic weight into power and influence” will
require Beijing to embrace the same or similar concepts and modes of operation pursued by the United
States,199 even if with Chinese characteristics. Latest
plans unveiled by the leadership indicate that China
is already moving in this direction. Beijing seeks to
modernize its financial system, enhance labor mobility, reduce corruption, and advance sustainability and
governance mechanisms.200 Once China achieves its
“comprehensive national power,” it is likely to change
its current strategy seeking to tap into external environment to generate internal development.201 It is at
this point that the choice of its strategy toward neighbors and the world will be of paramount importance.
How Beijing handles the restive Xingjian will show if
Beijing seeks to or will inflame or stabilize the broader
Central Asia.
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Regardless of whether China’s hegemony ultimately emerges in Central Asia, the United States, its
partners, and the regional states need to be prepared to
face an even more assertive China in the years ahead.
This is because Central Asia affords Beijing more room
for “offence,” given a lower level of “strategy rivalry”
in the region than China confronts in East Asia.202
Washington needs to launch a credible “Pivot to Eurasia” by boosting military engagement, upgrading its
NSRS, advancing cooperation with key partners, and
shaping China’s global ascendance, including in the
framework of its relations with Central Asian states.
This would mitigate China’s possible hegemony and
the negative effects of its growing influence on the cultural, economic, political, and military independence
of the Central Asian states, helping the United States
retain its leading position and role in managing the
global order. This is salient because Washington is
withdrawing from Central Asia, raising the question
on how to shape the region’s evolution and geopolitics
on terms favorable to the United States. It has done
a lot to open China, Central Asia, and South Asia to
the outside world. But unless it implements the previously discussed steps, Washington risks forgoing benefits of the region’s rise as a connectivity platform in
Eurasia and risks losing an opportunity to shape Beijing’s rise and the global order out of the region that is
becoming of rapidly growing strategic importance to
its main partner and challenger—China.
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